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United States policy requires that access to and dissemination of classified 
information be controlled. Separate networks and workstations for each classification do 
not meet user requirements. Users also need commercially available office productivity 
tools. Traditional multilevel systems are costly and are unable support an evolving suite of 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) applications. 
This thesis presents a design for a Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) 
that allows COTS workstations to function securely as part of a multilevel network that 
uses high assurance multilevel servers as the backbone. The TCBE will allow COTS 
workstations to use commercially available software applications, while providing a 
Trusted Path to a high assurance multilevel serv~r. . 
The research resulted in a design of a TCBE system that can be employed with 
COTS workstations, allowing them to function as untrusted clients in the context of a 
secure multilevel network. 
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Access to multiple levels of information is essential to the operation of many 
Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of the Navy (DON) organizations. The 
ability to access the information via a single computer terminal is cost ~ffective and 
efficient. Computer systems that allow the user to securely access different levels of 
classified material from a single terminal while maintaining the ability to use popular 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) hardware and software do not exist. 
Currently, the DoD allows access to multiple levels of information on automatic 
data processing systems by following a "system-high~' policy of classifying computerS and 
using "guard" computers to separate ne~works. A system-high policy states that all data . 
that is processed on system high equipment is considered labeled at the classification of 
the computer. For example, if a computer is labeled as a system-high or top secret 
processor, then any individual who is authorized to use that computer must have a . 
clearance level as high as the computer, even if that person uses the computer only to 
access and process unclassified material. 
Secure Department of Defense networks are maintained for each classification 
level. Guard computers -link high and low networ~s, such as the SIPRNET and the 
NIPRNET. These computers permit certain, controlled transfers of data between 
networks such as the movement of unclassified electronic mail to high networks. The 
guard ensures that the networks at each security level are correctly separated, but it does 
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not allow simultaneous multilevel access to the information. Most guards currently in use 
do not label data or prevent Trojan horses that may downgrade sensitive information 
without the user's knowledge. Additionally, multiple networks require that duplicate 
equipment to be installed and maintained within a single site. Many users of these systems 
must maintain a separate end terminal for each classification level on their desks in order 
to access the different classes of information. 
There are high assurance computer systems that allow multiple levels of 
information to reside on the same machine. These systems are commercially available and 
are purchased by the DoD p'rimarily to function as guard platforms. High assurance 
computers are costly to develop, purchase, and maintai? T~eir interfaces do not support 
commonly used commercial software (e.g. Microsoft products, or many popular UNIX 
applications). Additionally, since the cost of these systems is high, they cannot be placed 
on each desktop. 
To eliminate redundancy and cost, a solution to these problems that uses a few 
current high assurance systems as servers and many COTS computers as end terminals to 
provide a single secure multilevel local area network (LAN) should be found. By 
providing COTS solutions for the client end of a secure multilevel LAN, users will be able 
to take advantage of the security features in a high assurance system to process sensitive 
and classified data while using popular commercial softwaFe. 
The design of a Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) for COTS clients is a 
key part of a secure multilevel network. The TCBE helps ensure that the information 
processed is not compromised, and that it comes from a secure resource. Additionally, the 
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trusted path enabled by the TCBE at the client provides the user the capability to 
efficiently process all levels of information. 
B. SCOPE 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
• Development of Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) functional 
requirements for COTS clients of a Secure Multilevel Network. 
• System Specification documenting the design of a TCBE for COTS personal 
computers. 
• Development of a prototype TCBE for a COTS personal computer. 
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
I. Introduction 
Chapter I di~cusses the purpose and scope of the thesis. An overview of the 
following additional chapters ii provided: Chapter II, TCBE Functional Requirements for 
a Secure Multilevel Network; Chapter III, TCBE System Specification Development; 
Chapter IV, Software Implementation ofTCBE components; Chapter V, Hardware 
Implementation of TCBE components; Chapter VI, Conclusions and Recommendations; 
APPENDIX A. TCBE Design Development; APPENDIX B. TCBE Software 
Specification Document; APPENDIX C. TCBE Executive Source Code. 
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ll. TCBE Functional Requirements for a Secure Multilevel Network 
TCBE requirements will be developed following the Department of Defense's 
Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) for Class B3 systems [1]. The 
requirements that the TCBE must meet in order to operate as part of the multilevel 
network are addressed. The purpose of the TCBE is not to build a Class B3 system at 
the client, but to extend the evaluated Class B3 system that provides the locus of security 
control for the rt:IultiIevel secure local area network to t~e client systems. 
ID. TCBE System Specification Development 
Chapter III will document the development of the system specification and the 
design documentation for the TCBE. An analysis of the functional requirements will be 
discussed, a concept of operations will be developed, and the TCBE's basic operating 
modules will be outlined. 
IV. Software Implementation of TCBE components 
This chapter explains the design and implementation of each of the proposed 
. . . 
TCBE's modules. This chapter also explains how COTS software will be integrated into 
the TCBE framework. 
v. Hardware Implementation of TCBE components 
This chapter describes the hardware that was used and modified to reach the 
TCBE's security policy requirements. 
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VI. Conclusions 
Chapter VI contains the conclusions for the use and future development of the 
Trusted Computing Base Extension. The chapter focuses on the cost effectiveness of 
implementing the TCBE in a secure network environment and provides recommendations 
into future research areas involving the design and development of Trusted Computing 
Base Extensions. 
D. OVERVIEW OF APPENDICES 
1. Appendix A - TCBE Design Development 
This appendix provides the documents that were developed in the course of 
designing the Trusted Computing Base E~ension. The·first·document contains the 
. ( 
scenarios of TCBE operation. The next set of documents contains the state diagrams that 
were developed from the scenarios. The system's object diagram was produced next 
along with the system's layers and function modules. 
2. Appendix B - TCBE Software Specification Document 
This appendix provides the TCBE Software Specification Document. This 
document provides descriptions of the major modules and functions of the Trusted 
Computing Base Extension. 
3. Appendix C - TCBE Executive Source Code 




II. TCBE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SECURE 
MULTILEVEL NETWORK 
The goal of the TCBE is to allow the user the ability to access multiple levels of 
information via a single terminal device. As such, it will have the characteristics of the 
reference monitor concept: the TCBE is always invoked, it is tamperproof, and that the 
Trusted Computing Base Extension code is analyzable for correctness and security .. 
The TCBE will be established through modules and hardware that are attached to 
the client operating system and computer without modification to the operating system 
source code. By avoiding source code modification of the operating system, the design of 
the TCBE is simplified and its security processing is more easily evaluated. The TCBE 
will be considered as a volatile device that func~ions as a robu'st client without permanent 
data storage capabilities. The TCBE has the following requirements: 
A. TCBE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT 1 
The TCBE will prevent object reuse and data remanence. Object reuse is 
described as the ability of an unauthorized user tC) ac~ess data lett from a previous user's 
session [2]. The data could remain in memory, accessed through shared memory, or be 
stored inadvertently on a secondary storage device such as a hard drive. To satisfy the 
object reuse requirement, the computer system must make provisions to ensure that all 
poteritially shared objects such as data segments are clear of data or have been overwritten 
by a random pattern. of bits. 
"Data Remanence is the residual physical representation of data that has been in 
some way erased"[3]. Information still remains on storage media even after a user 
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application or operating system has called for the data to be deleted .. Data can be cleared 
from storage devices by overwriting the information such that normal operation of the 
system does not allow the information to be accessed. Information can be purged from a 
system by using physical methods such as a degausser which magnetically moves the 
storage media from a "recorded state to an unrecorded state" [3]. Ineffectively cleared 
memory and storage devices can lead to unauthorized object reuse after a change in 
session level or between users. 
Client workstations will be assumed to be under the physical control of a single 
user during a session. That user will logon and negotiate a session level. All data 
connected with that session will be purged from the client system by the TCBE at the end 
of the operation of the negotiated session level. User files will not be stored on the TCBE 
after the user has completed a session. Operat·ing sy~tem and application software for the 
TCBE will reside on read-only media. Data the operating system uses for normal 
operations will reside in volatile storage devices whose memory can be erased or quickly 
overwritten at the end of a session. 
B. TCBE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT 2 
The High Assurance Server will enforc~ the system's mandatory access control 
policy. The TCBE will only gain access to objects according to the policy that the High 
Assurance Server enfor~es. The High Assurance Server will mediate all user reads and 
writes from the TCBE. 
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C. TCBE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT 3 
The TCBE will support a Trusted Path for initial login and authentication. The 
Trusted Path provides assurance to the user that the TCBE is connected to the trusted 
server, and it provides the assurance to the trusted server that it is connected to an 
authorized client. Communications via this path shall be activated by the user or the TCB 
and shall be logically isolated and unmistakably distinguishable from other paths. The user 
will be able to invoke the Trusted Path via a "secure att~ntion key" (SAK) at any time in 
order to communicate directly with the high assurance server. When the Trusted Path is 
invoked, all client processing, except the trusted path interface on the TCBE, will be 
halted. The user will be able to switch session levels or log out once the Trusted Path is 
invoked. 
Identification and authentication of a single user will be initiated from the user's 
terminal via the TCBE. The authorization database will reside at the High Assurance 
Server. The TCBE will provide only user name and identification information such as 
passwords and biometric data to the server. After identification and authentication is 
complete, the user will have access to the objects (files) that the user is authorized for. 
D. TCBE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT 4 
The TCBE will consist of functional modules and well-defined interfaces that 
minimize the complexity of the TCBE. The TCBE shall maintain a domain for its own 
execution that protects it from external interference or tampering. By placing the TCBE 
on a controller board that manages the client computer's input and output functions, 
logical and physical separation from the client computer's operating system applications is 
9 
achieved. The TCBE will be designed so that unauthorized personnel can not modify its 
software modules. The system administrator or security officer will physically control the 
configuration management of the client computer operating system and applications. 
The TCBE will be designed so that it will support trusted recovery to a known 
secure state in the event of system failure. When loss of power occurs, all information 
that resided on the TCBE client shall be erased. When the TCBE is started again, it ·will 
initiate procedures that prevent object reuse and data remanence from the interrupted 
session. 
E. TCBE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT 5 
Interfaces to the TCBE will be well defined and non-bypassable. All secure access 
to the high assurance serVer from the client compufer will be via the TCBE. The protocol 
established between the TCBE and the high assurance server will ensure that clients 
without TCBE support will be unable to obtain service from the server. 
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III. TCBE SYSTEM SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT 
System development of the TCBE will begin with a descriptIon of the requirements 
of the system, followed by analysis of the functional requirements that will produce a 
concept of operations for the TCBE as well as form the basis of the system's modules. 
Once the basic modules have been outlined, the system will be broken into layers. The 
layers are formed by presenting the system in a bottom up manner, where the elements of 
the system at the higher layer require the functions and information that are provided by 
the elements at the lower layers in order to conduct their operations. Layering indicates 
which modules of the system have the greatest access to the system's resources and thus 
are conceptually more privileged. Thus an architecture in which objects are allocated to 
, ' 
hierarchically ordered layers is achieved .. 
. By breaking the TCBE into layers, we ensure that data dependencies travel from 
the least privileged modules to the'most privileged modules. Additionally, layering of the 
system allows the designer to refine the basic modules and break them down into layers of 
smaller modules that have well defined interfaces and are easier to implement. Since it is 
easier to demonstrate that smaller modules are performing in the manner desired, the 
designer's confidence that the TCBE will perform correctly is increased. 
Following the layering, the modules and their databases are designed. Interfaces, 
. i~put and output parameters and actual functions are defined. The designs of the software 
and hardware modules are discussed in Chapters IV and V. 
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A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A concept for how the TCBE will operate is developed by examining the 
functional requirements. An analysis of the requirements leads to operational scenarios 
and state diagrams for the TCBE. A brief description of the TCBE Concept of Operations 
is provided, the actual scenarios and state diagrams are presented in Appendix A. 
1. Initialization 
The TCBE will begin operations in an Initialization state. In this state the Tcim 
and its modules are loaded and the host computer's random access memory (RAM) is 
overwritten. At this point, the TCBE is in a wait state and all that is displayed to the user 
is a blank screen or a TCBE logo. 
. I 
2. Trusted Operations 
The trusted.operation state begins whenever the user presses the Secure Attention 
Key (SAK). The Trusted Path activates and begins an initialization sequence with the high 
assurance server (HAS). The initialization sequence first establishes that the TCBE is 
talking to the HAS and the HAS server provides the TCBE with the encryption key that it 
will use to encrypt further communications with the HAS along the Trusted Path. This 
trusted path encI)'ption key will encrypt all communications whenever the TCBE enters 
the trusted operation state. 
Once the TCBE has received the trusted path encryption key, the user will be able 
to login to the HAS. The user logs in by entering in a User-ID and password, as well as 
any other authentication information such as a smart card or biometric data. The TCBE 
encrypts this data with the Trusted Path encryption key and sends it to the high assurance 
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server for processing. Once the HAS authenticates the user, it sends a session encryption 
key to the TCBE. The session encryption key will be used to encrypt the data transfers 
between the host computer and the HAS for the selected session level. When the login 
procedure is completed, the user will be able to begin work at the selected session level, 
sWitch session levels, return to the current session after pressing the SAl<, or log out of 
the session. 
3. . Data Path Operation 
When the user begins work at the selected session level, the TCBE moves into a 
data path state. In this mode the TCBE acts only as conduit for the secure movement of 
data between the HAS and the host computer. Before operations in this state begin the 
TCBE wIII ensure that the host computer's' operating system is loaded and that the }:tost 
computer CPU is ready to begin operations. Once those tasks are complete the TCBE is 
ready to encrypt and decrypt data and send it to or receive data from the high assurance 
server. Temporary reads and writes such as swap files are sent to the volatile secondary 
. storage unit within the host computer. 
4. Trusted Path Options 
The user can press the Secure Attention Key at any point. If the SAK is pressed 
while the TCBE is in the data path state, the TCBE haIts the host computer's CPU and 
initiates a confirmation protocol with the high assurance serVer. The confirmation 
protocol simply confirms that the TCBE is communicating with the high assurance server. 
The user can then select any trusted path option except login. 
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.-----------------------------------------_. 
If the user chooses to switch session levels, then the current session encryption key 
is replaced by a new one from the high assurance server, which completed the processing 
required to support the user at the new session level. The TCBE resets the client host 
computer and overwrites its memory. Following the reset and clearing of volatile 
memory, the client operating system is booted on the host computer. 
If the user chooses to return to the current session, the TCBE commands the host 
computer's CPU to resume operations. 
When the user logs out of the session, the TCBE haIts the host computer's CPU 
and overwrites its memory. Once the high assurance server has acknowledged receipt of 
the log out request, the TCBE clears its own memory including the session encryption key 
and the trusted path encryption key. The TCBE moves into a wait state until the SAK is 
pressed. 
5. TCBE Physical Structure 
As described in Functional Requirement 4, the TCBE will be placed on a separate 
controller card that is connected to the host computer. Since the TCBE needs access to a 
keyboard and a monitor for input and output, two methods of physically implementing the 
TCBE are considered. 
a. Internal TCBE Controller Card 
By placing the controller card inside the host computer connected to the 
bus via the motherboard, the TCBE has direct access to the host computer's memory, 
keyboard, and monitor. Acting as a device on the host computer's system bus, the TCBE 
only has to signal an interrupt to gain control of the host computer. However, the TCBE 
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must contend with the client operating system's control over the same memory, keyboard, 
and monitor. For example, in this configuration the TCBE must provide the keyboard 
interrupt functions for the host computer in order to check each keyboard scan code for 
the Secure Attention Key. In many cases it may not be possible to insert code that will 
provide TCBE control over those devices once the operating system is loaded. 
h. External TCBE Controller Card 
In this configuration, the TCBE would have its own keyboard and display 
device, (similar to a Microsoft Windows CE Personal Digital Assistant). The TCBE 
would not have to contend with what the client operating system does with the host 
computer's I/O devices. However, an additional communications layer must be added to 
the TCBE, in order for it to effectively c.ontrol the ~ost computer. 
Both configurations hav~ advantages and disadvantages. The design of the 
TCBE is general eno·ugh so that it could apply to either configuration. However, due to 
the lack of involvement of the client computer's operating system in implementing the 
. TCBE as an external Controller Card, choosing the second configuration option for 
implementation is recommended. 
B. OUTLINE OF THE BASIC MODULES 
Chapter I provided the problem statement. Chapter II defined the requirements 
that the TCBE must meet in order to solve the problem. The analysis of the requirements 
determined the TCBE operational scenarios and states, which were described briefly in the 
TCBE Concept of Operations seCtion of this chapter. Following the concept of 
operations, the major TCBE modules are produced. Each of the major modules may have 
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sub-modules that perform internal module functions, the additional modules are detailed in 
the Software Specification Document located in Appendix B. 
1. TCBE Core 
The first module is the TCBE Core. This module is first activated when the 
system is turned on and when there is a switch in the session levels. The module will 
initialize the other TCBE modules, fonnat and overwrite the volatile secondary storage 
unit and hold the system in a secure waiting state until the Trusted Path to the high 
assurance server is invoked. Once the user has properly gained access to the system, this 
module will load or permit the client computer operating system to proceed and allow the 
host computer to. communicate with the high assurance server. Object Reuse functionality 
is provided by this module's ability to overWrite the host computer's memory. This is the 
module where control of the host computer, the client operating system and the activation 
and deactivation ofTCBE hardware reside. 
2. Trusted Path Module 
The Trusted Path is invoked when the user presses the SAK.' The primary 
functions the Trusted Path Module is the establishment ofa Trusted Path to the high 
assurance server, and to insure the user that the TCBE is connected to the high assurance 
serve~. The second function the Trusted Path Module provides is support for switching 
session levels. Logging out of the system is the third function that the module supports. 
This module contains the required protocols that initialize the connection to the high 
a~surance server and that conduct the required handshaking between the TCBE and the 
high assurance server in order to correctly establish a Trusted Path. 
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:---------------------------------------------
The Trusted Path Interface Module lies within the Trusted Path. This module 
displays the front end of the Trusted Path to the user and allows the user to enter in 
Identification and Authentication information. The user will be able to enter in a User-ID 
and password in response to prompts issued by the high assurance server. The module 
will pass this information to the Trusted Path protocol, which will.securely forward the 
information to the high assurance server. A token, such as a smart card or PCMCIA 
media, may also be used to provide additional authentication as well as provide encryption 
keys and algorithms to the TCBE. This module must have access to the monitor and 
keyboard for user interface functions. 
3. Data Path Module 
The Data Path Mo~ul~ serves as a'pipe between th~ ho~t computer and the secure 
Local Area Network. This means that the high assurance server appears to be nothing 
more than an additional storage device to the host computer. The module, via this 
representation, intercepts all user file accesses. The Data Path Module sends user data 
through the Encryption Module to the trusted server. 
The Data Path ModlJle is responsible for supporting the client end of the trusted 
computing base data transfer protoc0.Is (tcbdtp Y when the TCBE is in the Data Path State. 
In the Data Path State, the TCBE provides the secure communications path to the high 
assurance server. When the ~ser is finished with or saves the file, the TCBE supports the 
operation of those protocols that permit data to be stored on and retrieved from the high 
assurance server. 
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The tcbdtp are a set of protocols that may be similar to the standard file transfer 
protocol (ftp). The protocols' main purpose are to ensure that data travels correctly and 
securely between the high assurance server and the TCBE. 
The Data Path Module may consist of a driver that is installed in the client 
operating system. This driver would provide the storage device representation of high 
assurance server to the operating system. 
4. Keyboard Secure Attention Key Module 
The Keyboard Secure Attention Key Module (SAK) provides the user the ability 
to invoke the trusted path. In the configuration where the TCBE is connected directly to 
the host computer's bus, this module must lie either logically or physically between the 
keyboard and the client operating syste~ in order ~o ensure that it captures the appropriate 
key strokes when the user desires a tru~ted path. When the SAK is activated not only 
must the Trusted Path be initiated, but the client operating system must be halted and the 
TCBE prepared to overwrite the host computer's volatile memory. 
5. Encryption Module 
The Encryption module encrypts and decrypts TCBE data and user data. The 
module provides the management of the storage for a variety of encryption keys such as 
the Trusted Path Key and a session key. The Encryption module will lie between the 
communications device and the TCBE. By placing the encryption module in this position, 
the encryption module will provide a non-bypassable interface through which the services 
of the high assurance server are·accessed. Hence, data cannot be passed to the local area 
network unencrypted. This module also provides the interface to a cryptographic device 
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module. The cryptographic device module can encapsulate hardware'such as a 
FORTEZZA card or a software algorithm. This capability allows different encryption 
choices for each session or LAN configuration, and allows for easy upgrading of 
encryption devices, modules, and algorithms. 
6. TCBE Hardware 
The TCBE Hardware comprises the physical components of.the TCBE. These 
components include the TCBE's microprocessor and memory, the network 
communications device and the cryptographic device (which could also be software). 
Additionally, the TCBE must handle a keyboard and a display devic~ as well as the 
interface between the TCBE and the host computer. Depending on the configuration 
disc~ssed in section A.5 of this chapter, the keyboard and display device may be the host 
computer's or'separate components connected to a TCBE that resides outside of the host 
computer. In the case of the external TCBE, the TCBE to host computer inte~ace would 
consist of a cable connection. 
Each one ,of these devices will have their own TCBE drivers and interfaces to 
connect to the rest of the TCBE modules. 
C. LAYER DESCRIPTIONS 
The Trusted Computing Base Extension Layers are presented in Figure I.Each 
layer will be described beginning with the layer that has the 'most privilege within the 
TCBE. 
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Figure 1 TCBE Layer Diagram 
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The TCBE Hardware layer consists of the TCBE Hardware as described in 
Section B.6. of this chapter. All other modules depend on this layer to perform their 
functions 
2. Hardware Management layer 
This layer includes the TCBE's Memory Manager and the device drivers 
associated with the each device. 
3. Encryption Layer 
The Encryption Layer consists of the Encryption Module. The Encryption Module 
relies on the both the cryptographic device and the network communications device in 
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order to perform its functions. The Encryption Module depends on the Hardware 
Management Layer. 
4. SAK Layer 
The next layer is the Secure Attention Key Layer. The Secure Attention depends 
on the keyboard to operate. The SAK requires direct access to the Hardware 
Management Layer and the keyboard's memory buffers. 
5. Trusted Path Layer 
The Trusted Pat~ depends on the SAK to activate. It accesses the keyboard in 
order to receive user input and the monitor to display information to the user from the 
high assurance server. Si~ce the SAK can be p~essed at any time,. the Trusted Path 
Module's keyboard access depends on the SAK module to capture all keyboard input. 
The Trusted Path module communicates to the HAS via the Encryption Module. 
6. Data Path Layer 
The Data Path.Layer is the link between the host computer and the TCBE for 
passing user information. It communicates to the high assurance server viathe Encryption 
Module. This module allows the host computer operating system applications to conduct 
normal operations such as preparing data for local storage before it is handed off to the 
Data Path Module for secure transmission. 
7. TCB~ Main Layer 
The TCBE Main Layer consists of the TCBE Core Module and the modules 
necessary to initialize the TCBE and control the operation of the host computer. As such, 
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it depends upon the functions of the Trusted Path and the Hardware Management Layer to 
communicate to the host computer. It also depends on the Data Path Module when 
switching between Trusted Path and Data Path operating modes. 
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IV. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF TCBE COMPONENTS 
The software implementation of the TCBE is split into two portions. The first 
portion discusses the placement of the TCBE software within the client computer. The 
second part consists of designing the underlying operating system on .the TCBE that 
allows the various modules of the TCBE to interact. 
A. TCBE SOFTWARE PLACEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Before implementing the TGBE's software, the location of the TCBE's code was 
determined. Placement of the TCBE code must satisfy the TCBE functional requirements 
discussed in Chapter IT. In order for the code to be considered a part of the Trusted 
Computing Base it t:Jlust demonstra,te the characteristics of a reference monitor. 
Therefore, the placement of the code must ensure that the TCBE is always invoked and 
that untrusted mechanisms on the host computer can not circumvent it. Additiomilly, the 
TCBE must be tamperproof and its software small and modular to allow analysis of its 
self-protection features·and correctness of operation. The architectural placement of the 
tCBE can affect the extent to which software mechanisms must be constructed to achieve 
the reference monitor objectives. In fact, incorrect placement of the TCBE can make it 
impossible to engineer a high assu.rance security architecture. 
The three options considered for locating the code are: placing all of the code 
within a driver on the host computer's operating system, placing portions of the code in 
the host computer's memory alongside its oper~ting system and some of the code on the 
TCBE hardware, or placing some of the code within the client's operating system and 
some on the TCBE hardware. The options are graphically represented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 TCBE Software Implementation Options 
1. TCBE Software Implementation Option 1 
Ililiilill TRUSTED 
D UNTRUSTED 
If the TCBE software were placed wholly on the client operating system, then the 
modules would ·be designed as file system and hardware drivers. The TCBE hardware 
would exist mainly as a network interface card. All authentication, encryption, and 
Trusted Path operations would run from the client operating system. By using this 
approach there would be smooth interaction between TCBE components and the client 
operating system. TCBE code would be able to take advantage of the client operating 
system's functionality as well as commercially produced software tools. Additionally it 
would be potentially easier for commercial software development firms to develop and 
produce the TCBE. 
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However, the TCBE software would need to be ported to each operating system. 
As the commercial vendors of operating systems upgraded or patched their software, the 
TCBE would have to be monitored to ensure that the improvements did not interfere with 
the drivers or break the TCBE's functional requirements. Since the TCBE is within the 
client operating system's structure it is also occupying the same domain as the operating 
system. This placement violates the fourth TCBE functional requirement, which states that 
~he TCBE must maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from external 
interference or tampering. If the commercial OS has a security flaw then the entire TCBE 
and by extension the secure ri~twork' s security policy could be violated. This problem is 
mitigated somewhat by the fact that the OS could not be .m04ified on the host computer, 
however it does not stop changes to the system during run-time, nor prevent malicious 
code passed by data driven attacks, from affecting the software during a session. 
2. TCBE Software Implementation Option 2 
The second option involves not placing any TCBE software within the client 
. operating system at all. This could be implemented by placing the TCBE code with 
interface and host computer hardware control functions in the host computer's memory. 
The TCBE code would become a second interrupt vector table for the client computer. 
The interrupt vector table holds the addresses for host computer's interrupt handler code. 
The TCBE would "hook", i.e. replace, the interrupt addresses with vectors that pointed to 
TCBE intemipt handlers. All critical hardware and software interrupts managed by the 
original interrupt vector table would be handled by the TCBE software. 
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The TCBE hardware would consist of a controller card as well encryption devices. 
This option would capture all system inputs and outputs and direct then to the high 
assurance server without involving the client operating system, since the TCBE code has 
direct access to the host computer's hardware. 
This option has several drawbacks. First, the code that is placed on the host 
computer and controls the hardware would be machine dependent, and therefore must be 
ported to each platform. The code must be small enough so that the client operating 
system and the TCBE can be active simultaneously. There is no guarantee that the client 
operating system will not overwrite the TCBE's portion of memory when it is initialized 
or during normal operations which violates TCBE Functional Requirement Four. In order 
to overcome this problem, a memory manager must be dev~loped that partitions the host 
computer's memory. This partitioning system'must not allow the client operating system 
to overwrite the TCBE's partition. 
Since the TCBE code on the host computer would have direct access and control 
of the hardware it would be similar to constructing another small and primitive operating 
system on the computer. All interfaces, or drivers, to other devices (such as cryptographic 
peripherals) would have to be written at the hardware system level. This would involve 
writing the interfaces in the assembler code particular !o the microprocessor of the host 
computer. Similar to the TCBE software, these device drivers would also have to be 
rewritten for each platfon.n that the TCBE is installed in. 
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3. TCBE Software Implementation Option 3 
The third option involves placing a few untrusted functions on the client operating 
system and having the TCBE software reside on the TCBE hardware. This implementation 
would present the TCBE solely as a network interface device to the client operating 
system. The interface would consist of a single untrusted TCBE "device" driver. The 
C).dvantage of this alternative is that the device driver can use some of the features of the 
client operating system to perform simple non-critical tasks, such as data transmission 
prepani.tion, while assuring that critical functions, such as encryption and authentication 
are located within the TCBE. The driver code would be the only software that would 
have to be changed to accommodate different operating systems, hardware platforms, or 
client operating system modifications. Additionally, the majority.ofthe TCBE code need 
only be written once, and only has to perform the services outlined iil the functional 
requirements. 
The main drawback to this choice is that the TCBE cannot be a simple 
combination of a network interface card and an encryption device. The TCBE must have 
the ability to intelligently manage several different functions and hardware, as well as have 
enough memory to store data transmissions and TCBE code. Essentially the TCBE would 
almost have to be another computer. Therefore, in order to operate that computer, a 
small embedded operating system must be used for the TCBE. Because commercial 
embedded operating systems are proprietary, the source code cannot be accessed. This 
means that commercially developed embedded operating systems may have security flaws 
that are unacceptable for a secure environment; hence, a unique embedded operating 
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system may have to be developed for the TCBE. Additionally, commercial operating 
systems may not offer the specific functionality desired for the TCBE, or conversely, they 
may offer additional features that increase the complexity and the security vulnerabilities 
of the system. 
Despite the complexity involved with the third option, it does provide the best 
means of ensuring a Trusted Computing Base Extension that meets the desired assurance 
requirements. The design of a small embedded operating system or executive for the 
TCBE Hardware is discussed in the next section. 
B. TCBE OPERA 'rING SYSTEM DESIGN 
The Trusted Computing Base Extension will be designed as an executive. An 
executive is a system that' does not require multitasking or dynamic rescheduling of 
processes. Since the software modules that run on an executive execute in a 
predetermined manner, an executive system can be less complex and more efficient than 
~ultitasking operating systems [4]. 
1. TCBE Executive Requirements" 
In order for the TCBE to function effectively and efficiently, the executive must 
perform a few operations reliably. First, the TCBE executive must be able to control and 
interface with its hardware. Next the executive has to manage memory for its code 
modules. The executive has to have a mechanism for defining a state. For the executive, 
a state ic:; defined wh,en it has its own or well-defined address space and stack 
configuration and is ready for execution. The executive will only start a state's operation 
when it receives the correct inputs and matches those inputs against a well-defined and 
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unchangeable set of starting criteria for each state. The executive will terminate a state's 
operations when the state has completed its functions or is interrupted by a set of 
predetermined events. The executive must correctly transition from one state to another. 
In order for the executive to transition between the states it must have a mechanism that 
correctly determines the correct state to transition to given the system's current state and 
a set of conditions. 
Finally, the executive must have a method for handling asymmetric 
communications between states, the hardware, and the user. Asymmetric communications 
are inputs to the system that are not part of a planned sequence of occurrences that are 
encoded in a program. Examples of asymmetric communications are hardware and 
software interrupts and exceptions. 
2. TCBE State Operations 
In the Trusted Computing Base Extension software design, a state is defined as a 
common grouping of functions and values that describe and effect the TCBE's current 
operating behavior. For example, the Trusted Path State is the operation of the TCBE . 
when it is communicating directly with the Trusted C6mputing Base on the High 
Assurance Server. It is made up of functions and variables that include the trusted path 
communications protocols, logging in and the switching of session levels. If the extension 
is not communicating with the TCB directly, then it is no longer in the Trusted Path State. 
Each state may consist of several sub states that further describe exactly what the 
TCBE is doing. Trusted Path Login is a substate of the Trusted Path state. However, 
functions that perform specific actions in support of a state are not substates. While the 
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TCBE may be in the process of encrypting data to go across the network, its mode of 
operation is not encrypting data. Instead, the data encryption function is used in support of 
a TCBE behavior such as logging in, which require the encryption of user information. 
A state machine engine is represented by a table of transitions and actions [5]. In 
the TCBE executive, the state matrix consists of the states of the TCBE and a set of 
actions that include asymmetric communications, called events, which cause transitions. 
Figure 3 represents a state machine engine. 
STATES 
EVENTS 1 2 3 4 
A 2 4 4 4 
8 1 3 4 2 
C 1 3 3 3 
0 3 4 3 4 
Figure 3 State Machine Engine 
The state machine engine constitutes a simple algorithm that keeps track of the 
present state of the system in a current state table and monitors actions with an event 
table. When an event occurs, the engine checks the state matrix for the position wi~hin the ' 
matrix of the event and the current state and then transitions according to what is at that 
location in the matrix. 
For example, from Figure 3, if the system is currently in state 3, and event A 
happens then the executive will transition to state 4. If event C happens and the system is 
in state 3, then no transition will occur. Additionally, all events are serialized so there is 
no conflict caused by simultaneous events. 
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a. TCBE Software States Defined 
The analysis of the concept of operations, and the TCBE architecture 
presented in Chapter III provided the basis for determining the states that form the 
TCBE's operations. The TCBE operates in four main software states. The main states 
diagram is displayed in Figure 4 below. 
The TCBE system starts from an off or inactive state. Since, there is no 
power to either the TCBE or the host computer, the TCBE Off state is not considered an 
operating state. The next state is the Trusted Computing Base ExteJ).sion Initialization 
State (TCBE Init). In this state the TCBE's software is loaded and its hardware is 
TCBE STATE DIAGRAM 





. TURN HOST COMPUTER O~F 
Figure 4 TCBE State Diagram 
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initialized. The host computer is also turned on in this state, although its operating system 
is not yet loaded. This state automatically transitions to the next state which is the 
Trusted Computing Base Extension Wait (TCBE Wait). In this state the TCBE is waiting 
for the Secure Attention Key to be pressed in order to invoke the Trusted Path. TCBE 
Wait is only a waiting state. 
Once the SAK is pressed the TCBE transitions to the Trusted Path State. 
This state is made up of several substates. The sub states are presented in Figure 5. The 
first substate is the Trusted Path Initialization State (TP Init). It is in this state that the 
TRUSTED PATH STATE DIAGRAM 
(NO TRUSTED PATH) 
(TP BUffER 
CLEARED] 
Figure 5 Trusted Path State Diagram 
SAK PRESSED 
Trusted Path is first set up between the user and the Trusted Computing Base on the high 
assurance server for a particular session. The next substate is the Trusted Path 
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Confirmation State (TP Confirm). In this state, the user, via the TCBE, verifies that a 
Trusted Path exists between the TCBE and TCB. The next substate is the Trusted Path 
Display (TP Display). , In the Trusted Path Display the user selects the Trusted Path 
options oflogin, logout, switch sessions, or reattach to a session. Because of the behavior 
of the TCBE during these options, login (TP Login), logout (TP Logout), and switch 
sessions (TP Switch Session) are also considered substates of the Trusted Path. 
Reattaching to a current session is merely a transition function between the Trusted Path 
State and the last state, the Data Path State. 
The Dat~ Path State is broken into two sub states that are presented in 
Figure 6. The first substate is the Data Path Initialization State (OP Init). In this state the 
TCBE loads the client computer's operating sy~tem into memory.. Once this operation is 
complete, the TCBB transitions to the Data Path Active (OP Active) state. This state is 
characterized by use of the client computer as a normal workstation with the secure flow 
DATA PATH STATE DIAGRAM 
ICLIENT OS NOT LOADED] 
ILOAD CLIENT OS) 
ACTIONS IN DATA PATH factivo) STATE 
1. TRAP OAT AlCOMMAN 0 
2. TRANSLATE DATAICOMMAND 
[CLIENT OS LOADED] 3. SEND DATAICOMMAND TO H.A.S. 
4. RECEIVE DATAICOMMANDFROM H.A.S. 
SAK PRESSED 
Figure 6 Data Path State Diagram 
, , . 
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of user application data between the host computer and the high assurance server. 
h. TCBE Events Defined 
Trusted Computing Base Extension Events are asymmetric functions that 
effect a transition between states. , The most critical event is the Secure Attention Key 
(SAK). When the SAK is pressed, the TCBE must conduct the actions that Will result in a 
transition to the correct state. The SAK event incorporates the use of the keyboard and 
its associated interrupts. 
The next event is the transition event. When a state has properly 
completed its actions or certain conciitions are met (signified by [] on the state diagrams), 
the state activates a transition event, which causes tne TCBE to shift to the next state. 
Specialized transition functions include the login, logout, switch session, and reattach 
session events. These events are only called from the Trusted Path Display State and 
cause a transitio~ from that state to the state corresponding wit.h the event. 
The final event is the keyboard event. This event is caused from the 
keyboard hardware interrupts. It only affects the TCBE in two states. In the TP Display 
state, the keys entered from the keyboard allow the user to choose Trusted Path options 
such as login or logout. In the TP Login State, the keyboard is used to enter user 
. . 
identification and authentication information. In both of these states, the keyboard event 
causes no transition, it only allows the functions within those states to read and if 
necessary, display, the keyboard scan codes. Otherwise the keyboard is allowed to 
function without affecting TCBE operations. 
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c. TCBE State Matrix 
The state matrix for the TCBE is presented in Figure 7. The states are 
presented across the top of the matrix with the events listed along the left side. Each state 
is assigned a number which is placed in the appropriate position within the state matrix. 














Figure 7 TCBE State Matrix 
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d. TCBE Executive Operation 
TCBE Executive operation is presented in the following Pseudo-code. 
Initialize System 
Clear memory 
Initialize Data Structures 
35 
Define States 
Assign address space 
Assign Stack space 
Build State Table 
Set Initial State and event 
Call State Machine Algorithm 
Do {State transitions until TCBE is turned off 
Events call new state transitions} 
States are defined from functions that are written in the program code. 
The definition of the state includes the function name, its parameters, and a state 
identification number. Each function is assigned a set address space and fixed amount of 
memory. 
The state table is built by assigning each location in the state matrix a 
pointer to the state identified by its state .identification number. The executive then assigns 
an initial state and a transition event. The State Machine Algorithm is then called and 
continues until the TCBE is turned off 
e. State Machine Algorithm 
The State Machine Algorithm is presented in the following pseudo-code. 
Machine called 
Save current State 
Select the next State 
Check Event Table for entry 
Check Current State Table 
Get new state from location in the State Table 
Reassign memory and reinitialize TP Init, TP Confirm, and 
Login if required 
Switch Control to new State 
New state operates until next event 
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Certain states such as the TP Confirmation state and the Login state need 
to have local variables cleared and their entire process restarted after events to prevent 
user and trusted path authentication data from being leaked.' If a user is logging in and has 
entered user identification data but has not finished before being interrupted and pressing 
the Secure Attention Key, then that information may still reside in local storage on the 
TCBE. Another user may be able to manipulate the system and get that information if it is 
not removed. Therefore those states are restarted from the beginning of their instruction 
sequences. 
The Data Path State will start at the next instruction in its instruction 
sequence if its session is interrupted and then reattached to by the user. If a different 
session level is selected, or a new user logs in, then the Dat~ Path is restarted from the 




V. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF TCBE COMPONENTS 
The hardware of the Trusted Computing Base Extension is intended to maximize 
the functionality of the system. The hardware configuration of both the TCBE and the 
host computer are important to ensuring that Functional Requirement Four, which calls 
for tpe TCBE to operate a domain separate from the that of the host computer, and 
Functional Requirement aile, which requires that there be object reuse and data 
remanence services at the client computer, are satisfied. " 
A. TCBE HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS 
Chapter III discussed two options for the physical placement of the Trusted 
Computi.ng Base Extension Hardware .. Whether the TCBE is implemented as a card that 
is mounted inside the host computer or as a separate terminal device with a 
communications interface with the host computer, the overall design requirements remain 
the same. 
1. Memory 
The allocation and use of memory is the most important part of the TCBE. The 
system's memory will contain not only the operating software but it will also contain 
TCBE databases such as encryption keys, which include the session keys and initialization 
keys. The operating software should reside in read only memory (ROM). Once the 
operating code is "burned" into the ROM it cannot be changed. This is the equivalent of 
designing a microprocessor as the TCBE's state machine, engine. The only way that this 
code can be changed is if the memory is replaced. Replacement of the TCBE's hardware 
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should only be done under controlled conditions. Checksums can be incorporated into the 
operating code. Checksums use a memory and hardware signature to verify that the code 
has not been changed.. If the hardware has been changed or removed there will be no . 
method of communicating with the Trusted Computing Base at the server. 
The TCBE must have volatile memory that stores TCBE databases, TCBE code 
module execution stacks, user access information, as well as user interface data. The 
TCBE's software design includes specific interfaces between modules and layers that 
prevent overflows of data between the various functions of the TCBE. A~ditionally, the 
design of the executive ,:!ses a memory allocation system that provides each state of the 
TCBE its own block of contiguous memory within the system's random access memory 
upon initialization. The memory allocation syst~m also includes functions to reinitialize 
. . 
the memory for each state upon a state transition if required. The state machine algorithm, 
presented in Chapter IV section B.2.e, determines which states get reinitialized when a 
state transition occurs. 
The TCBE should also have procedures to completely clear the TCBE's random 
access memory of encryption keys and other session identification and interface 
information when a session is complete. The TCBE operating system includes procedures 
for erasing the areas of volatile memory used by each state when the system transitions 
between states, this function could include the same algorithms that are developed to clear 
the host computer's memory. Finally, when the TCBE loses power, the TCBE's entire 
random access mem?ry must be cleared. 
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2. Microprocessor 
The TCBE's microprocessor plays a key role. As described in Chapter IV, the 
TCBE system must be able to handle a variety of functions efficiently. There is no 
requirement for multitasking of TCBE functions. Multitasking of the defined TCBE 
functions will lead to a more complicated system that will be harder to verify that it is 
operating correctly. The Trusted Computing Base Extension's CPU should be sufficiently 
fast enough to make TCBE operations· transparent to the user. The. central processing unit 
should have sufficient power and speed to efficiently handle encryption algorithms that 
may be software implementations within the TCBE. 
3. Communications Interfaces 
The TCBE controls two communications interfaces. The first interface is: the 
connection to the host computer. The. TCBE virtualizes the network interface card (NIC) 
to the host computer via the TCBE driver s.o that the host computer thinks it is 
communicating with a regular NIC. The TCBE ensures the proper encryption and 
transmission ofthe data sent to the high assurance server. The bandwidth of the 
connection between the TCBE and the host computer should be large enough that routine 
passing of data and commands is transparent to the user. 
The second interface is the one established between the TCBE and the TCB over 
the local area network. This connection will be through a common network interface 
card. The NIC operations should not be modified in any way. All cryptographic functions 
should take place in the Encryp~ion Module, which includes encryption devices and 
software, on the TCBE. The NIC only passes encrypted data to and from the Trusted 
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Computing Base Extension. This separation of functions allows troubleshooting of the 
NIC and its communications protocol without affecting the TCBE's cryptographic 
functions. In addition, it permits modularity; the cryptographic and trusted path protocols 
that are established between the TCB and the TCBE may be examined separately. 
B. HOST COMPUTER HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS 
The host computer requires few changes from a normal workstation or personal 
. . 
computer configuration. The major changes are interrelated and include the amount of 
random access memory available to the system, and the presence of hard disk drives and 
other secondary storage devices. 
1. Hard Disk Drive Presence' 
A hard disk drive is used as permanent storage offiles and data on workstations. 
It normally consists of metallic platters with a magnetic coating that holds the information 
even if there is no power. Because it is non-volatile storage, many commercial operating 
systems rely on the hard disk drive for loading operating system software into the 
workstation's memory, and storing user information, operating system configuration data, 
and page-swapping of data between real and virtual memory. 
The TCBE is required by Functional Requirement One to prevent object reuse and 
data remanence at the client workstation. Moreover, the requirement states that operating 
system software and user applications will be stored on read-only media. Therefore if the 
system were to have a hard drive, its capability to write data would have to be disabled 
after the operating system and applications are loaded. This would require modification of 
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the COTS operating system, which is not possible due to the proprietary nature of 
commercial software applications. In order to accomplish read-only operations, the 
operating system must be configured at this point to not swap pages of information 
between memory and the hard drive. If the host computer has sufficient random access 
memory then the impact of the lack of virtual memory on a hard drive for paging is . 
minimal. 
. There are two alternatives to the hard drive in the host system. The first 
alternative is to use a compact disk - read only memory (CD-ROM) as the repository for 
the operating system and applications. This method would allow the system security 
administrator to record system disks with the correct co~~ration data as well as the 
proper applications. Once these disks are recorded they cannot be overwritten during 
. . 
normal operations. 
A potential vulnerability to this approach is ~hat newer CD-ROM systems permit 
recording on unused portions of the CD. This would require that the CD-ROM be 
initialized as a "multi-session", which allows multiple recordings on a single disk, by the 
original recorder of the disk and the presence of CD-ROM recording software installed in 
the operating system. System configuration can be used to prevent this vulnerability. The 
system administrator should not initialize the CD-ROM as "multi-session" nor should the 
recording software be installed in the original operating system configuration for each 
workstation. 
The host computer would require a CD-ROM drive. This should not be a problem 
since most computers and workstations come with these drives already installed. The 
main disadvantage to using CD-ROM disks is that their data transfer rates are 
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considerably slower than those of hard disk drives. This may cause an unacceptable delay 
between sessions, as the entire operating system must be reloaded each time a new session 
is started or when there is a switch between session levels. 'Additionally, each 
workstation's CD-ROM would have to be replaced whenever the system administrator 
decided to update or add software to the secure LAN's client computers. 
The other alternative is to store the operating system and workstation applications 
on the high assurance server and have the server send a copy of the software to the client 
computer at each login or change of session levels. In this case, the high assurance server 
ensures the integrity of the software and this makes configuration management of client 
computer software easier as all clients use copies of the one centrally managed software 
component. Additionally, this option may be less expensiv.e than using CD-ROMs, since 
any change in that first alternative's operating' system or application software requires the 
purchase new CD-ROMS for each client computer on the network. 
There is one main disadvantage to this alternative. This drawback is the size of 
current commercial operating systems and applications. A basic configuration of 
·Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 requires 80 Mbytes of hard disk drive space. This does not 
include commonly used Microsoft Office applications. On a 10Mb/sec local area 
network, it would take approximately sixty-four secol}ds to transmit the operating system 
code, if the network was not busy. This does not include the time for the client system to 
load the system software in its memory. This problem may be alleviated by faster 
networks and data transfer protocols, but as the size of commercial software and the 
number of clients on the network grows, this wait time may become unacceptable. 
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If the host computer cannot have a hard drive it must not have any other secondary 
storage devices including floppy disk drives. If a floppy drive is associated with the 
system it should be disabled or removed. The high assurance server should include 
services for transferring data to secondary storage devices that it directly controls. 
2. Amount of Ran~om Access Memory 
The second major change required to turn a workstation into a host computer for 
the TCBE relates to the amount of random access memory at the workstation. A' 
minimum of 128 Mbytes of random access memory should be installed on the host 
computer, with 256 Mbytes considered optimal for today's commet:cial software. Since 
RAM is easy to wipe clear after each use, the host computer will use RAM exclusively to 
run ,its operating systems and applications and locally store user produced data. 
Additionally, the operating system may need to use RAM as virtual memory to write 
pages to during page swapping operations since the secondary storage device. normally 
used for that function would be inaccessible. 
The intrqduction of computers such as Network Computers and Windows terminal 
devices may provide may provide the optimum client for the secure network. These 
computers are designed to operate with random access memory only and without the use 
of non-volatile secondary storage such as hard disk drives or floppy disk drives [6]. 
c .. IMPLEMENTATION OF TCBE' 
A subset of the Trusted Computing Base Extension is implemented for this thesis. 
The subset is designed to show that the state machine engine operates properly when the 
Secure Attention Key is pressed. 
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The TCBE subset is implemented on an Intel 80486 based personal computer. The 
microprocessor operates at 33 MHz. The system has eight megabytes of random access 
memory and a network interface card, as well as a keyboard, monitor, and a floppy disk· 
drive. This implementation resembles the TCBE option of placing the TCBE in a separate 
terminal device such as a PDA. In fact, the personal computer used can be thought. of as a 
trusted PDA with a NIC attached. 
Th~ TCBE executive was written in assembly and the C programming language 
using the Borland C++ (v 5.00) compiler and Turbo Linker. This program is 
approximately 3000 lines of code in length. For this implementation, the executive relies 
only on the personal computer's basic input-output syst~m @10S) for access to the 
system's hardware. It is loaded into the personal computer using the system's disk 
operating system (DOS). Once loaded, the TCBE calls no other DOS functions, including 
system calls and interrupts. This version of the implementation used less than 70000 KB 
. of the personal computer's RAM. Future implementations using a compiler and linker 
optimized for a controller card or PDA platform will most likely use less space. 
Ultimately, the system DOS will have to be replaced to provide a complete assurance 
architecture. 
The executive included the capability for the Secure Attention Key, alt-S, 
operations to be examined using a test function. As proof of concept each of the TCBE's 
states was implemented as stub procedures that displayed their state name when they were 
activated. Appendix C contains the source code for the executive and the make file and 
commands required to load and use the software. The stub procedures presented in the 
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source code provide the examples necessary to complete the functions of the TCBE so 





The design ofa Trusted Computing Base Extension is feasible. None of the 
elements that went into the design of the TCBE arebeyond current technological 
capabilities. This chapter discusses the cost effectiveness of the TCBE as well as 
recommendations for future work required in order to make the TCBE function as part of 
a secure local area network. 
A. COST EFFECTIVENESS 
Construction of the TCBE as a combination controller card and network interface 
card or as a personal digital assistant type device would cost less than $500. The 
additional costs to tpe system would involve the addition of-system memory. Given the 
current prices for random access memory, 256 Mbytes of RAM should cost less than 
$200. Therefore total additional cost should be approximately $700 per system or less if 
the TCBE is produced in large quantities. This compares to the approximate $4,500 cost 
of having three separate computers for each security level, or costs an order of magnitude 
higher for purchasing an evaluated high assurance multilevel system for each user on the 
local area network. If intelligence information is being processed, the number of security 
levels increases dramatically and s? the savings are considerable. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Host Computer 
Host computer research can be broken into three areas. The first area is host 
computer operating system control and loading. Chapter V discussed the issues 
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surrounding the loading, or booting, of the client operating system. Control of the 
operating system can be accomplished by installing the TCBE via the device driver on the 
host computer. The device driver will be written such that when the device interrupts, the 
operating system halts and the host computer's microprocessor follows the TCBE's 
instructions. 
Since it is possible for the host computer's microprocessor to save the state of the 
CPU when it is interrupted, it may be possible to save the state of the client operating 
system when there is a session level switch [7]. This would allow only the restarting of 
the state of the session operating system as opposed to the current mode where the entire 
client operating system must be rebooted. A method to store and reload the operating 
system state must be developed. 
The second area ofrdearch involves implementation of the TCBE'sobject reuse 
functions. The TCBE must support object reuse of host computer memory, which' 
includes clearing all memory including caches within the host computer. The procedures 
to conduct the clearing functions performed by the TCBE must be developed. Present 
designs only provide the program interfaces for those functions. 
The third area of research for the host computer involves the structure of the 
system's random access memory. Optimally the host computer's RAM should be 
structured into logical RAM drives. There should be a minimum of two RAM drives built 
when the host computer is turned on. The first RAM drive is where the client operating , 
system is loaded. The second RAM drive is where the client OS would temporarily store 
user-produced data. This would simplify the configuration for the client operating system. 
Each RAM drive would appear to the OS as a physical drive such as C: and D: drives. 
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There is source code available for constructing a RAM drive and an associated file system 
[8]. Research needs to be conducted into constructing two separate drives from one 
source of physical memory and determining how to construct the RAM drives from 
functions resident on the TCBE. 
2. Trusted Path Research 
The establishment and maintenance of the Trusted Path between the TCBE and the 
TCB is perhaps the most important component of the secure local area network. If the 
Trusted Path is not constructed properly, then intruders on the net can compromise the 
entire system by either impersonating the High Assurance Server or authorized users. The 
design of the TCBE places the Trusted Path operations into five tentative. states: 
Initialization, Confirmation, Login, Logging Out, and Switching session levels. Of those 
five states, the Initialization State is the most critical phase of the e.stablishment of the 
Trusted Path. 
In the Initialization State, the TCBE must first securely identify itself to the 
Trusted Computing B~se then the TCB must authenticate itself to the TCBE. The first 
·question to be solved is the identification of the TCBE to the TCB. If there is a . 
permanent identification code stored with each TCBE, then a malicious user could place 
the TCBE in a host computer that has local secondary storage capability or copy the code 
onto some non-TCBE device. 
Once a method for TCBE identification is developed, there must be a way of 
protecting the secrecy and integrity of the identity information for transmission over the 
LAN. The techniques for protecting this information may include software, hardware, and 
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configuration management equipment and procedures. One issue involved in developing 
these protection features is the use of encryption. Any encryption algorithm used to 
support these techniques must allow decryption by the TCB, so it would have to be 
previously negotiated. If the algorithm is negotiated beforehand, then it must be decided 
where the keys for the encryption scheme are stored. This question leads to determining 
the best and most secure way to store the key( s), which is similar to the storage of the 
TCBE identification code. Fortunately, there has been research conducted that looks into 
the requirement for security in a distributed system and several protocols such as 
Needham-Schroeder [9] and Kerberos [10] have been developed. But none of the 
research or the developed protocols seems to answer the requirements for the Trusted 
Path. The remaining phases of the Trusted Path development are solvable once the 
Initialization protocol is developed. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Trusted Computing Base Extension provides an economical method to 
connect commercial off-the-shelf personal computers or workstations to a secure local 
area network. A systems software engineering approach was taken to produce a design for 
the TCBE that satisfies the security requirem~nts of connecting to a multilevel system 
while requiring minimum changes to a COTS computer or operating system and 
application software. . 
. 
Chapter II listed the functional requirements for the Trusted Computing Base 
Extension. These requirements should serve as guide for development of future versions 
of the TCBE or other devices that are designed to enhance the security ofa system or 
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network. Chapter III provides the analysis of the requirements that went into the design 
of the system. The concept of operations describes the operations of the TCBE as a 
sequential process engine that is to be encoded in the TCBE operating code and 
applications. Chapter IV detailed the development of the software needed for the TCBE. 
The desIgn of this system requires a clear understanding 'of the hardware of both the host 
computer and the physical components of the TCBE. The outcome of this design is a 
limited operating system, or executive, that can be evaluated for its correct operation. The 
TCBE operating system can be expanded, once it is shown to be operating correctly, to 
include additional states, or functions, as the need arises. 
Chapter V discussed the hardware requirements for the client computer and the 
TCBE. None of the hardware needs to be specifically developed for this system. Client 
computers are easily available. The components that make up the TCBE can be 
manufactured by an embedded controller card producer or purchased as part. of a modified 
Personal Digital Assistant. In the future, thin client systems such as Network Computers, 




APPENDIX A. TCBE DESIGN DOCUMENTATION 
The appendix represents a preliminary design for the TCBE.· Additional effort will 
be required to ensure that the layering of the TCBE meets the requirements for a high 
assurance architecture. 
The documents presented here follow the object-oriented methodology developed 
by Rumbaugh, et al.[5]. The requirements for the TCBE were discussed in Chapter n. 
These requirements formed the basis for the TCBE design. The scenarios of the TCBE 
were produced first. The scenarios are a step by step presentation of the expected 
operation of the TCBE from turning it on to off. 
From the scenarios, state diagrams were developed. These state diagrams 
. graphically represent the behavior of the system at specific points in its operation. The 
state diagrams were the basis for developing the layers and the dependencies of each of 
the code modules and the entire TCBE. The state diagrams are also used to develop the 
TCBE executive. 
Follo:vIng from the reference, the object modules were defined. They are 
presented in this document in graphical and tabular format. An object diagram was drawn 
that detailed the function of the software modules. The combination of the state diagrams, 
layer and module functions, and object diagram were combined with a hierarchical, top-
down approach to. system architecture. This permitted objects to be placed in partially 
ordered layers such that dependencies were well understood and circularities eliminated 
from the software architecture. The result was the System Software Specification 
Document that is presented in Appendix B. 
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A. TCBE SCENARIOS 
1. Initialization 
A. 
1. Tum on the host computer (if the TCBE is installed within 
the host computer then it turns on when it receives power) 
a. BIOS POST Test 
b. The TCBE begins functioning in place of the client 
operating system, since there is no secondary storage' 
holding the client's operating system. 
c. TCBE Core Loaded. 
d. TCBE in Initialization Mode. 
e. TCBE Core initializes all devices. 
2. Tum on the host computer; Tum on the TCBE (if TCBE is 
a separate device) 
a. BIOS POST Test. 
b. Host computer start up stopped here since there is no 
operating system installed on ·secondary storage. . 
c. TCBE Core Loaded. 
d. :-CBE in Initialization Mode. 
e. TCBE Core initializes all devices. 
B. TCBE Core Overwrites host computer memory 
C. TCBE Core halts host computer CPU 
D. TCBE Core loads all TCBE Modules 
E. TCBE Interface Displayed 
1. TCBE Video Screen Cleared 
2. TCBE Logo displayed 
2. Secure Attention Key (SAK) pressed, on TCBE keyboard 
A. Keyboard Generates SAK interrupt. 
B. SAK Module sends activate Trusted Path command to TCBE Core. 
C. TCBE Mode switched to Trusted Path (TP) Mode . 
D. Encryption 'lIlOdule mode switched to Initialization by TP Module 
1. Session Key Store Flags set to Null 
2. Trusted Path Key' Store Flag set to Null 
E. Trusted Path conducts initialization sequence with the HIGH 
ASSURANCE SERVER; to ensure that the appropriate computers 
are talking to each other. 
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F. Trusted Path module receives Trusted Path encryption key (TPK) 
from High Assurance Server. 
1. Trusted path Key Store Flag set to active 
G. Trusted Path Established 
H. Go to Trusted Path Interface 
3. Trusted Path Interface 
A. Trusted Path Interface presented on TCBE Monitor on command 
from the high assurance server 
B. User enters, one of the following options 1. ~ogin; 2. Logout; 3. 
Change Session Level; 4. Start Session; 5. Reattach Session 
C. If Login go to Trusted Path Login 
D. If Start Session then go to Data Path Mode 
E. If Logout go to User Logs OfT 
F. If Change Session Level go to User switches session level 
G. If Reattach Session go to User reattaches to .current session 
4. Trusted Path Login 
, ' 
A. Trusted Path login interface presented on TCBE monitor on 
command from the high assurance server. 
B. User enters login name and password 
C. User info encrypfed with TPK goes through TP Protocol to High 
Assurance Server 
D. User enters desired session level (make sure there is a default 
session level at TCBE) 
E. Session Level info sent to High Assurance Server 
F., High Assurance Server sets a session level at desired Session Level, 
returns a session key to Trusted Path Module " 
G. Trusted Path sends key and session level to Encryption Module 
H. Encryption Module receives Session Key, stores it under a session 
level key store 
1. Session Key Store Flag set to active 
1. Encryption Module tells TP Module that it has received the 
Session Key 
J. TP Module switches Encryption Module to the appropriate session 
mode' 
K. Trusted Path Module tells TCBE Core that session is ready 
M. Go to Trusted Path Interface 
5. Data Path Mode 
A. TCBE State switched to Data Path Mode 
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B. If Client OS is not loaded then go to Data Path Mode (Initial) 
C. If Client OS is loaded then go to Data Path Mode (Active) 
1. Data Path Mode (Initial) 
(If initial session) 
1. TCBE Core tells CPU to resume 
2. TCBE Core Overwrites host computer RAM. 
3. TCBE Core constructs memory resident file system; 
4. TCBE Core loads client OS in File System 
5. TCBE core loads Input/Output (VO) Trap; 
a. 10 Trap stays resident and communicates with NIC via 
encryption module 
6. Client OS completes loading 
7. Go to Data Path Mode (Active) 
2. Data Path Mode (Active) 
1. If the host computer CPU is idle then the TCBE Core tells CPU to 
resume. 
NIC accepts Data. 
2. User operates on top of client OS 
3. User VO trapped by 110 Trap: 
a. User command translated to High Assurance Server command 
b. TCBE data block constructed with command 
c. Data block encrypted 'w/session key 
1. Data block sent to Encryption device 
2. Data block encrypted 
3. Data block returned to the Encryption Module 
d. Data block sent to High Assurance Server 
e. Data block decrypted by High Assurance Server 
f High Assurance Server processes request 
g. High Assurance Server constructs data block 
h. High Assurance Server Encrypts data block 
1. High Assurance Server sends data to TCBE client 
j. Communications Device receives data block 
k. Send data block to encryption module for decryption (similar to 
c. Data block encrypted w/session key) 
1. Decrypted data sent to Data Path 
m. Data Path sends data to client OS 
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4. OS 110 not trapped sent to secondary memory / or controlled path 
3. User Invokes Trusted Path While Using Qient OS 
1. SAl( Pressed 
2. SAK sends signal to TCBE Core 
3. TCBE State switched to Trusted Path; TCBE core idles client 
OSlHost Computer; Network Interface Card stops accepting data 
4. Encryption Module Switched to Trusted Path mode 
5. TCBE calls TP Module 
a. Path confirmed 
b. TP Mo!lule controls keyboard; monitors for SAK 
6. Go to Trusted Path Interface . 
6. User Logs Off 
A. Go to User Invokes Trusted Path While Using Client OS 
B. User selects logout 
C. tCBE Core halts CPU 
D. Logout signal sent to high assurance server 
E. TCBE Erases Client PC memory; Session Keys; Trusted Path Key; 
F. Logout complet~ signal rec~ived from the high assurance server 
G. TCBE interface displayed . 
H. Host computer ~creen blank 
7. Uset Switches Session Level 
A. Go to User Invokes Trusted Path While Using Client OS 
B. User selects switch session level . 
C. User enters desired session level 
D. Session level information sent to high assurance server (encrypted) 
E. High assurance server sets session at desired session level returns a 
session key to Trusted Path Module 
F. Trusted Path sends key and session level to Encryption Module 
G. Encryption Module receives Se&sion Key, stores it under session 
level key store 
1. Session Key Store Flag set to active 
H. Encryption Module tells TP Module that it has received the Session 
Key 
I. TP Module sets Encryption Module to that session mode 
(encryption module knows know to use the key that matches the 
mode until told by the TP Module to switch) 
J. TCBE erases secondary memory (Or stores this information on the 
board if possible) 
K. TCBE prior session key (Or stores this information if possible) 
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L. Encryption Module tells TP module that it has received the Session· 
Key 
M. Trusted Path Module tells TCBE Core Trusted Path complete 
N. Go to Trusted Path Interface 
8. User Reattaches To Current Session 
A. TP Module sets Encryption module to the session mode active 
before SAK pressed. 
B. Trusted Path Module tells TCBE Core Trusted Path complete. 
C. Go to Data Path Mode 
9. User Presses SAK While In Trusted Path Mode 
A. TP module does the following 
1. If confirming Trusted Path then restart confirmation process 
2. If initializing Trusted Path then restart initialization process 
3. If Trusted Path is idle then confirm Trusted Path 
4. If switching sessions, logging in or out then do the next 
three steps: 
a. Trusted Path BufferslMemory cleared 
b. Trusted Path Confirmation Protocol Initiated 
c. Trusted Path confirmed 
B. Go to Trusted Path Interface 
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B. TCBE STATE DIAGRAMS 
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[CLIENT OS LOADED] 
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2. TRANSLATE DATAICOMMAND 
3. SEND D)lTAICOMMAND TO H.A.S. 
4. RECEIVE DATAICOMMANDFROM HAS. 
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C. TCBE OBJECT DIAGRAM 
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CONNECTION 
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~ 2. S DESIRED SESSION • r:=:l 
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In the Object Diagram the lines indicate the associations~ or the relationships 
between the software modules. The dashed lines are used to signify associations that will 
travel over physical communication links between hardware components of two modules. 
These links are only present in the interface portion between the TCBE and the host 
computer and in the secure local area network operations of the TCBE. Although the 
object diagram indicates that the TCBE Keyboard and Monitor are part of the TCBE, this 
is meant only as an abstraction. The associations do not represent dependencies between 
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modules, they serve only to represent the connections that either conceptually or 
physically link the components. 
D. TCBE FUNCTIONAL MODULES DIAGRAM AND DEFINITIONS 
The following table provides a brief description of each module's functions. It also 
provides a listing of the dependencies for each module. 
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Table 1. Preliminary Module Definitions and Dependencies 
Module Name 
TCBE MAIN MODULES 
Host Computer/Client OS 
TCBE Core 
TCBE Modules Loader (TML) 
Client OS Loader (COSL) 
TCBE Core Loader (TCL) , 
PC Memory Controller (pCML) 
CPU Controller (CPUC) 
Device Initializer 
TCBE MAIN DATABASES 
TCBE State 
PC State 
TRUSTED PATH MODULE 
T~sted Path User Interface (TPI) 
Module Function 
Host computer that holds the client 
OS; contains a driver that sees the 
TCBE as just a NIC 
Core of the TCBE; controls the 
initialization of the modules of the 
TCBE; maintains TCBEcurrent 
state. 
Loads and initializes the TCBE 
modules 
Loads the Client OS on the host 
Computer; may need to create a 
Ram drive file system 
Loads the TCBE Core into the 
controller device's memory on 
startup 
Overwrites PC's memory 
Places the PC's CPU into one of " 
three modes 
1. . Idle (No instructions executing) 
2. Active (Nonnal Operation of 
the CPU) 
3. Stop (Shutdown the Computer 
for restart) 
Initializes the TCBE's hardware 




3. Trusted Path 
4. Data Path 





Presents Trusted Path interface and 
command items to the user; 
Collects user info for the Trusted 
path 
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Trusted Path " 
Data Path 
CPU Controller 
TCBE Keyboard and Monitor 
Input Interface 
Display Interface 









Input Interface Driver to operate TCBE keyboard SAKModule 
TCBE Keyboard 
Display Interface Driver to operate TCBE Monitor TCBE Monitor 
Trusted Path Initializer (TPINIT) Module produces an initialization TP Protocol 
key and algorithm that starts the 
Trusted path protocol 
TP Confirmation Protocol Confirms presence of the Trusted TP Protocol 
Path with the high assurance server 
TP Protocol The protocol that establishes the Encryption Module 
Trusted Path between the TCBE and 
theTCB 
Encryption Module Mode Switcher Switches the mode of the TP Communication Interface 
(EMMS) Encryption Module between Trusted 
Path Mode and the Appropriate 
session key. 
TP Communication Interface Communications protocol between TCBE Hardware 
the Trusted Path Module and the 
Encryption Module to the NIC 
TRUSTED PATH MODULE 
DATABASES 
Initialization Key Key produced by the TPINIT that 
initializes the Trusted Path 
User InfQTri1ation (User Info) . Memory Buffer where data is stored Depends on high assurance server: 
before encryption and transmission. 
Store of user identification and 
authentication information: 
1. User Name 
2. Password 
3. Biometric Data 
4. Desired Session Level 
5. Present Session Level 
6. Default Session Level 
.. 
·SECURE ATTENTION KEY 
MODULE 
Secure Attention Key Module Module contains the routine Keyboard Driver 
(SAK) necessary to recognize a keyboard 
combination as a SAK and send a 
start Trusted Path command to the 
TCBE core. This is coded as part of 
an interrupt routine in the TCBE 
Executive. 
Keyboard Driver Low level keyboard routine that TCBE Keyboard 
allows the SAK module to work; 
This code sits on top of normal 
! keyboard driver and modifies the 
driver to provide the SAK code; 
May not be necessary depending on 
how the SAK module and the 
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I 
keyboard driver are implemented 
SECURE ATTENTION KEY 
MODULE DATABASES 
Scan Codes The memory buffer where the scan Keyboard 
codes are compared against 1h:e Memory 
SAK 
DATA PATH MODULE 
Input Output Trap (10 Trap) Translates user data into High io Trap Communication Interface 
Assurance Server Format; May Encryption Module 
convert client OS file system 
commands to High Assurance 
Server Commands; 
Directs User data to Encryption .. 
. Module and NIC. Both the"IO Trap 
and the 10 Trap Communication 
Interface would be coded as part of 
the TCBE Driver within the client 
operating system. 
10 Trap Communication Interface Protocol to talk to Encryption 
Module 
ENCRYPTION MODULE 
Encryption Module .. This module provides the interface Encryption Device(s) 
between TCBE components, the Memory Manager 
physical Encryption device or 
program and the NIC. : 
Encryption Module Mode 
1. Trusted Path 




Trusted Path Key Store for the. trusted path key Memory 
provided by the High Assurance 
SerVer. 
Session Keys Multiple storage for the session keys MemoI):' 
provided by the High Assurance 
Server 
DEVICE DRIVERS 
TCBEIPC Interface Virtual NIC to host computer Memory Manager 
interface TCBE Hardware 
Encryption Device The physical device or software Memory Manager 
routine that performs the actual TCBE Hardware 
encryption of data. There may be 
multiple Encryption Devices 
Network Interface Card The physical device driver that Memory Manager 
connects the TCBE to the secure TCBE Hardware 
LAN 







provides keyboard input to the 
TCBE 
The physical device driver that 
allows the TCBE to display 
infonnation on the screen 
Module that manages the memory 
resources of the TCBE. 
The physical memory provided for 
the TCBE for its operation 








APPENDIX B. TCBE SOFTWARE SPECIFICATION DOCUMENT 
The TCBE software specification document lists the TCBE's Modules and their· 
interfaces. The specification document is partitioned by major TCBE module. Not all of 
the functions, particularly the Trusted Path and the host computer hardware control 
functions, have complete specifications. Those will need to be developed as part offuture 
·research which was detailed in Chapter VI. 
1. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE EXTENSION SOFTWARE 
DESCRIPTION 
The Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) is a platform designed to connect 
to a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) p.ersonal computer or workstation .. The TCBE will 
. . 
allow the personal computer to function as a client on a secure muItilevellocal area 
network. The TCBE will provide this functionality by meeting a subset of the Department 
of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) standards for a 
Class B3 evaluated system [1]. 
2. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE EXTENSION LAYERS 
The TCBE's software modules are designed in a layered manner. The higher level 
modules depend on the lower level modules for operation .. For example, the proper 
operation of the Trusted Path Module is dependent upon th~ Encryption Module 
performing its cryptographic operations. Chapter III, Section C. describes the layers of 
the TCBE from the most privileged layer to the least privileged. 
69 
3. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE EXTENSION MODULES 
Description: This is a software specification document. The descriptions presented here 
are a representation of the functionality of the software modules. rhey do not represent-
the complete architectural layering. The software prograrruiter may find that due to 
hardware and software constraints that the internals of the system should change. Any 
modifications should allow the TCBE to complete the requirements described in Chapter 
II of this thesis. 
Variables: 
TCBE_State = {Initialization, Wait, Data_Path, TrustedY,ath} 
Record Data_Block_Type = [string Command, generic Data] 
Record TCBE ))ata J3lock [string Command, Data_Block_Type Data_Block, integer 
Size of Data_Block] 
3. 1 SAK MODULE 
3.1.1 Description.: The SAK M09ule provides the operation of the Secure Attentiori Key 
for the Trusted Computing Base Extension. It is dependent upon the keyboard 
driver within the Hardware Module for proper operation. This module will be 
_ coded as an interrupt within the TCBE's operating system. 
3.1.2 Variables: 











Input 1: Scan Codes 
Outputs 
Output 1: SAK _Pressed 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: Check scan codes for SAK keys. If the correct buttons are 
pressed then send true. Continuous monitoring until the SAK keys are 
pressed. This function should be coded as an interrupt within the TCBE's 
operating system. . 
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3.2 TRUSTED PATH MODULE 
3.2.1 Description: The Trusted Path Module contains the functions and protocols 
necessary to operate the Trusted Path between the TCBE and the high assurance 
server. It depends on the Encryption Module, the SAK Module, and the Hardware 
Module for proper operation. The functions within this module are vague and 
represent an abstraction as to what will physically happen at the TCBE. They may 
change considerably depending on how the Trusted Path is actually constructed. 
3.2.2 Variables: 
Trusted_Path_Status = {Established, Not_Established} 
Trusted_Path _State = {Idle, Confirming, Initializing, Logging_Out, Logging_In, 
Switching_ Session_Level, Clearing_Buffer) 
Trusted_Path _Command = { Start_Session, Reattach_Session, Login, Logout, 
Switch _ Session_Level, Confirm, TP _Idle} 
Encryption_Key Session_Encryption _Key 
Integer Session.:... Number 
Record Trusted_Path_Session_Info = [Session_Number, 
Session _ En~ryption _Key] 
Record Trusted_Path _Session_Table = [Current~Session ~ Number, 
Trusted_Path _ Session_Info] 
Record Trusted _Path_Buffer =[integer Desired_Session _Level] 
Record Current _User_Information = [U sername, Password, Biometric_Data 











TP Start Trusted Path 
- - -
Inputs 
Input 1: TCBE _State 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function initiates the Trusted Path. It checks to ensure 
that the TCBE and the host computer are in the correct state in order to 
begin. 
Idle Trusted Path 
- -
Inputs 



















Return Value:· Trusted Path Command 
- -
Description: This function displays a Trusted Path Interface screen on the 
monitor. 
Pseudo-code 
Trusted_Path _State = Idle; 
Loop { 
TPI _Display _ TP flenu; 
If Command = Confirm 
Then TP Confirm Trusted Path; 
- - -
. If Command == Login 
Then TP .)-ogin; 
If Command = Switch _ Session_Level; 
Then TP Switch Session Level; 
- - -
Exit when Command = Start_Session, Reattach_Session, or Logout 
} 
return (Command); 
TP _Confirm_Trusted _Path 
Inputs 
Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function confirms that a trusted path exists to the user. 
Pseudo-code 
TP _Clear .J3uffers; 
Trusted_Path _State = Confirming; 
"Code to confirm trusted path"; 
If confirmation successful then return to calling function 






























Output 1: Username 
Output 2: Password and/or Biometric data 
Output 3: session level 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function handles the logging in to the high assurance 
server. This function does not perform the actual login. It only forwards 
the encrypted information to the high assurance.server. 
TP_Logout 
Inputs 
Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value 
Description: This function handles the logout ofthe high assurance server. 
It does not perform the actual log out, only forwards the command and 
then waits for the receipt of the confirriled logout signal from the high 
assurance server. The function will ensure that the all the buffers within 




Input 1 :integer New_Session_Number 
Outputs . 
Output 1: 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function performs the switching of the session l~vel at the 
::rCBE. It will get the appropriate session key, then make the call to start a . 
new seSSIon. 
Pseudo-code 
TP:... Get_Session _Key; 
Trusted_Path.:... Session_Table. Current_Session _Number = 
New_Session _Number; 
TP _Start_Session; . 
TP _Start_Session 
Inputs 



























Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function makes sure that the TCBE is ready to start a 
session. It will load the appropriate encryption key into· the Encryption 
Module and then start the Data Path. 
Pseudo-code 
If (EM_Mode _ Switch(Data _Path, 
Trusted_Path _Session_Table. Current_Session yumber)) 
Then TCBE _Switch _ State(Data yath); 
TCBE_State = Data_~ath; 
Else Return (Encryption module error) 
TP _Get_Session_Key 
Inputs 
Input 1 : None 
Outputs 
Output 1: Session_Encryption_Key 
Return Value: 




Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: 
Description: This function clears all memory buffers used by the Trusted 
Path Modules. 
TPI _Display _ TP _Menu 
Inputs 
Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None . 
Return Value: . 
Description: This function displays a Trusted Path Interface Menu on the 
TCBE's monitor. It also provides the mechanism by which user 
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I. 
information is entered from the keyboard and sent to the high assurance 
server and the Trusted Path module. 
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3.3 TCBE CORE MODULE 
3.3.1 Description: The TCBE Core module provides the functions necessary to 
interface with the host computer. It is dependent on all the ·other modules of the 
TCBE for correct operation. The descriptions here are intended to provide a 
sketch of the TCBE Core's functionality. They do not represent a complete 
architectural layering. 
3.3.2 Variables: 
Integer Session_Number IIOne assigned to each session for the current user 
Record Client_aS_Information II particular state of the CPU and OS when 
. halted by TCBE. Note: to be used when TCBE has ability to hold Client 
as state. 
Record Session_Info [Session_Number, Client_aS_Information] 
Record Session_Table [integer Current_Session_Number, Array of Session_Info] 
Data_Path_Mode = {Initial, Active} 
Client_aS_Status = {Loaded, Not_Loaded} 
CPU_Command = {Activate, Idle, Stop} 
Data_Path_Command = {Start, Stop} 
PC_State = {Idle, Active, Stop}· . 









TCBE _ Switch_State 
Inputs 
Input 1: TCBE _State 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean Result 
Description: This function changes the TCBE State and its functioning to 
the called upon state. Once this operation is complete it will return true if 
the switch was successful. 
Pseudo-code 
Result = False; 
If TCBE State = Data Path 
- -
Then Result = TCBE _CPU _ Controller(Activate, 0); 
If Client as Status = Not Loaded 
- - -
Then if Result = (TCBE_Initialize_Data_Path) 
Then Result ::;: DP _Path(Open); 





















Then Result = DP _Path(Open); 
If TCBE_State = Trusted_Path 
Then Result = DP _Path(Close); 
. Result = TCBE _CPU _ Controller(Idle, 0); 
IfTCBE State = Wait 
Then Result = DP yath(Close); 
Result = TCBE _CPU _ Controller(Stop, 0); 
IfTCBE_State = Initialization 
Then Result = TCBE _Initialize; 
Return(Result) 
TCBE Initialize Data Path 
- --
Inputs 
Input 1: ~one 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function activ~tes the host computer and ensures that the 
client operating system is loaded. . 
Pseudo-Code 
If (TCBE _CPU _ Controller( Activate, 0)); 
If (TCBE _Load_Client _ OS(O)) 
Then Client OS Status = Established; 
. TCBE _Activate pata _Path 
. Inputs. 
Input 1: integer Current session number 
Outputs 
Output 1: 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function will load the correct operating system state 
depending on the session level. This function is used when switching 
session levels. (For future work when capable of saving Client OS state 
For each session level) 
TCBE Load Client OS 
- - -
Inputs 
Input 1: integer Session Number 
Outputs 

























Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function loads the Client OS into the host computer 
TCBE _Module_Loader 
Inputs 
Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This module loads each module of the TCBE in a distinct 
memory location within the controller card. This will be important if the 
entire TCBE must 'be coded in assembly. 
TCBE CPU Controller 
- -
Inputs 
Input 1: Command 
Input 2: integer Session_Number 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function controls the 'host computer's processor and' 
memory. May be coded as an interrupt to the host computer. 
Pseudo-Code: 
If Command = Idle 
Then TCBE _Save_PC _ State(Session_ Number); f fif possible 
TCBE _Erase _ Secondary_Memory; 
If Command = Activate 
Then TCBE _Start_PC _ State(Session _Number); 
If Command = Stop 




Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 






























Description: This function provides the initialization routines for the 
TCBE. 
TCBE Save PC State 
- --
Inputs 
Input 1: integer Session Number 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function saves the state of the PC and registers when the 
Trusted Path is invoked. This function may not be necessary if the 
TCBE _CPU_Controller is constructed as an interrupt. However, if future 
work were to allow multiple sessions without rebooting between sessions 
then this function would have to be developed. 
TCBE _Start_PC _State 
Inputs 
Input 1: integer Session Number 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This module loads the state of the PC according to the 
Session Number. When multiple sessions are not possible, the Session 
Number will always be zero indicating a reload of the entire system. 
TCBE ~Erase _Secondary_Memory 
Inputs 
Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function erases the ~ost computer memory by writing a 
random pattern of one's and zeroes in the host computer's RAM and 
caches. 
Function: TCBE _Display 
Inputs 
Input 1: None 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: None 
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3.3.3.11.4 Description: This function displays a blank screen before the Trusted Path 
has been started. 
• f 
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3.4 ENCRYPTION MODULE 
3.4.1 Description: The Encryption Module provides those functions that interface with 
the encryption devices or algorithms used by the TCBE. 






















Input 1: TCBE _State 
Input 2: Session_Number 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: Switches the encryption module to the sent in state and to the 




Input 1: TCBE_Data_Block Black_Data 
Input 2: Integer EM_Socket 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: integer 
Description: This function takes the data and encrypts it before sending it 
. to the Communications device. It -then takes the return from the 
communications device and decrypts it. The decrypted data is assigned a 
buffer position corresponding to the EM_Socket. 
Pseudo-code 
TCBE_Data_Block Red_Data 
CD_Encrypt (TCBE_Data-.Block, Black_D~ta, key); 
NIC_ Write (COInm_Port_No, Black_Data, size) 
NIt~Read (Comrn_Port_No, Buffer, size, Black_Data); 
CD_Decrypt (Black_Data, RedJ)ata, key); 


















Input 1: Integer EM_Socket 
Outputs 
Output 1: IeBE_Data_Block 
Return Value: integer 
Description: Ihis function returns the size of the data located in the 
EM_Data_Buffer at the EM_Socket. Ihe data has been copied to the 




Input 1: IeBE_Data_Block Red_Data 
Input 2: Integer EM_Socket 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: None 
Description: Ihis function assigns the data to a spot on the 




3.5 DATA PATH MODULE 
3.5.1 Description: This module provides the functions to operate the Data_Path. It 
depends on the Encryption Module and the Hardware Module to operate 
correctly. This module would serve as an interface to a TCBE Driver that is 
installed in the client operating system. 
3.5.2 Databases: None 
3.5.3 Functions: 
















Input 1: Command {Open, Close} 
Outputs 
Output: Boolean 
Description: This function starts the Data Path between the host computer 
and the high assurance server. The data path is merely a pipe with one end 
the Client OS and the other end the Encryption Module. When this pipe is 
opened the Client OS receives a signal the path is ready. When the pipe is 
closed the Client OS can no longer send data to the High Assurance Server 
DP Get 
Inputs 
Input 1: string Filename 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: FILE Pointer 
Description: This function gets a block of data or file from the high 
assurance server via the TCBE and a data transfer protocol. It uses the 
Trusted Computing Base Data Transfer Protocols (tcbdtp) discussed in 
Chapter III. 
Pseudo-code 
Convert tcbdtp Get function into TCBE_Data_Block 
EM _ Send(TCBE _Data_Block, EM_Socket) 
EM ~eceive(TCBE _Data_Block, EM_Socket) 












Input 1: Data 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: None 
Description: This function gets a block of data or file from the host 
computer and sends it to the high assurance server via the encryption 
module. It uses the Trusted Computing Base Data Transfer Protocols 
(tcbdtp) discussed in Chapter III. Whether this function waits for an 
acknowledgement is up to the designers of the tcbdtp or other 
communication protocols. 
Pseudo-code 
Convert tcbdtp Send function into TCBE _Data JUock 
EM _ Send(TCBE J)ata _Block, EM_Socket) 
3.6 TCBE HARDWARE 
3.6.1 Description: The TCBE Hardware Module provides the interfaces between TCBE 






















. Input 1: TCBEJ)ata_Block Redpata 
. Input~: EncryptionJ<ey key 
Outputs 
Output 1: TCBE_Data_Block Black_Data 
Return Value: Boolean 




Input 1: TCBE_Data_Block Black_Data 
Input 2: Encryption_Key key 
Outputs 
Output 1: TCBE _Data_Block Red_Data 
Return Value: Boolean 




















3.6.3 . .3.4 
Function: NIC Write 
Inputs 
Input 1: Integer COlnm_Port_No 
Input 2: TCBE_Data_Block Blackpata 
Input 3: Integer size of data 
Outputs 
Output 1: None 
Return Value: Boolean 
Description: This function sends encrypted data to the communications 
device to send on to the net 
Function: NIC _Read 
Inputs 
Input 1: Integer Comm_Port.:...No 
Input 2: TCBE _Data .-Block Buffer 
Input 3: Integer size of data 
Outputs· 
Output 1: TCBE_Data_Block Black_Data 
Return Value: Boolean 




APPENDIX C. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE EXTENSION 
EXECUTIVE SOURCE CODE 
The source code contains the files necessary to load and operate the implemented 
subset of the Trusted Computing Base Extension. The files provide include the C 
language headers and source code as wdl as the assembly language modules. The 
makefile for the project is included as well as a batch file. The batch file is used to . 
overcome the conflict between long file names and the eight character file name limitations 
placed on compiling and linking the code on Microsoft Disk Operating System (MSDOS). 
1. IMPLEMENTATION FUTURE WORK 
Most of the functions that are identified in the specification were not built for this 
implementation and are dependent on the future work mentioned in the Conclusions 
chapter. However, there are several basic operating functions that are missing from this 
implementation that are needed to produce a fully operational Trusted Computing Base 
Extension. 
a. Interrupt Service Routines 
Interrupt Service Routines (ISR) are needed to manipulate the TCBE's keyboard. 
These ISR's are hardware dependent. Currently, the Secure Attention Key is tested by 
using'a test function: SAKTest, which causes the· event to happen within the TCBE's 
executive. 
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h. Memory Manager 
The memory functions present in this implementation are simple and static. 
Starting at a static starting address, a constant size list of fixed-size memory blocks is 
built. Each state is assigned a memory block in sequential order, i.e. state 1 gets memory 
block 1, state 2 gets memory block 2, etc. When the state is finished with the block, the 
block is designated as free. However, the block is never used again by another state. If a 
·state needs a new block of memory, it uses the next free sequential block of memory on 
the memory list. For example if there are five states, and state 2 frees its block and then 
nee~s another block of memory it will be assigned memory block 6. This happens until all 
of the memory blocks have been used once. Then the system is out of memory and no 
longer operates. A dynamic memory management system needs to be developed .. The 
dynamic memory manager should be able to use blocks of different size, and allow states 
to reuse different blocks of memory after the memory has been overwritten by an erasing 
function. 
2. ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE TO C LANGUAGE LINKAGE 
The code developed for the TCBE was written in the C and Assembly 
programming languages. Because of this linkage several, there are several requirements 
that must be fulfilled before modifying, compiling, and link~ng the source code. 
a. Resolving Memory and Linkage Issues 
In order for the names of functions that are called across different language 
models to be recognized, the following switches have to be applied when assembling and 
compiling the source code. 
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Assembly code: TASM Irnx code.asm 
TASM is the name of the assembler. In this case Borland's Turbo Assembler. The 
Irnx switch that tells the assembler not to change the case of the names of the procedures 
that are present in the Assembler code. T ASM will automatically change all characters to 
uppercase. The e language does not change the case of its functions. If this switch is not 
used, the linking operation will not work. 
C Code: Bee -c -ml code.c 
Bee is the name ofthe compiler. In this instance it is the Borland. e compiler. The 
, -c switch tells the comp.iler not to link the code, this will be accomplished in the batch and 
make files. The -ml switch tells the compiler to compile the code using the LARGE 
model. . The LARGE model means that the pro~ram' s code and data reside in different 
, . 
segments in memory. This is necessary because of the size of the code and the fact that it 
is written in two different languages. The assembler code must have the" .model large" or 
similar statement present at the beginning of its program. 
h. ,Resolv,ing Shared Procedure and Function Names 
In addition to not changing the case of its functions when the code is compiled, the 
e language adds underscores to the function names in the object code file that is produced 
after compilation. Since Assembly language does not add the underscore to its procedure 
names, the underscore must be added to all procedures that are called from e language 
modules and the underscore must be added to Assembly procedures that are called by e 
modules. For exampie: 
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Assembly Program 
public _function 1 ; This is an Assembly function called by a C module 
extm function2 ; This is a C function called by an Assembly module. 
<beginning of Assembly Program Body> 
_functionl proc far 
<body of _function 1 > 
_functionl endp 
<ending of Assembly Program Body> 
In the C language module, _ function2 will be written as function2. 
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3. TCBE IMPLEMENTATION SOURCE CODE 
a. Custom.h 
/* Filename: Custom.h 
Author: Micheal Podanoffsky; modified by Jason Hackerson 
Date: 04 August 1998 




Make sure all parameters here are customized to your needs. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
#define NUM STATES 
. I 12 /* --' number. of states ------ */ 
#define:MEM BLOCKS 
7 /* -- number of events ------- * / 
#define MAX_STATE_NAME 32 /* -- max characters in state name -- */ 
#define MIN STACK SIZE 128 
- -
/* Serial Communications Events - Not used in this implementation of the 
TCBEX */ . 
/* -- enter in the enum list the 
names of any custom event flags -- * / 
typedef enum { 
NOT_WAITING = 0, /* keep this line here * / 
COM I_RING, 






COM2 DATA AVAILABLE, 
- -COM2_CHANGE_C~~ 
COM3_RING, 
COM3 _TX _EMPTY, 









1* -- keep this entry alone -- *1 
h. TCBEX.h 
1* Filename: tcbex.h . 
Author: Micheal Podanoffsky; Modified by Jason Hackerson 
Date: 04 August 1998 . 
Function: Provides Header file for tcbe executive 
*1 
#include "Custom.h" 
I'll< 1111111111111 System Events 1111111111111111111111111111111111111 *1 
1* --- These are events that serve as inputs into the stMe machine engine ---* I 












1* TCBEX system states *1 













typedef enum { 
REATTACH, 







1*--- TCBEX system flags system flags help the state machine engine keep track 
of what has been initialized ---* I 
typedef enum { 
TCBE _INIT YLAG, 
TP_INITYLAG, 
DP INIT FLAG 
- -
}flagTypes; 
1* /111/11111111 Other Defines 111111111111111111111111111////////// */ 
#define FALSE 0 
#define TRUE 1 
#define NULL OL 
#define PERIODIC 1 
#define CURR STATE 
#define CURRENT_STATE 
#define CURRENTSTATE 
#define NO _ARGUMENT 
OL 1* indicates current task *1 
CURR STATE 1* indicates currenttask *1 
CURR STATE 1* indicates current task */ 
NULL 
#define event 
#define far _ address( s, p) 
(unsigned long)( (p ))) 
unsigned int 1* event flags stored in unsigned ints *1 
(void *)((unsigned long)((unsigned long)((s)) « 16) + 
extern unsigned long *SysteQ1.Clock; 
1* /1// /11 I I I I I / I I I I I I II 11//1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Ii I I I I 
Error Codes 
I I I I I I I I I I II I I II I I I I I II II II II I I I I I I I II I I I IIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II *1 
#define SUCCESS 0 
#define ERR_TASKALLOC_FULL SUCCESS - 1 
#define ERR_TIMERID _NOTFOUND SUCCESS - 2 
#define ERR_INVALID _ADDRESS SUCCESS - 3 
#define ERR INVALID EVENTID SUCCESS - 4 
- -
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/* //// //11 //////// //////////////1////// // ////// // // // / / /II / / / / / / / / II / / 
State Structure 
This control structure defines a State. A state is a grouping of functions, 
that detennines the TCBE's current Mode of operations. When a state is 
suspended, all of the registers including instruction address, flags, etc ... 
are stored in the state's stack and the suspended bit is set. The 
suspended bit indicates that the stack contains registers to pop 
before starting the state. The timing variables are left in the structure to 
support a future version of the TCBE that may use multitasking. 
/ // // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / // / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / * / 





















events[ NUM_EVENTS ]; 
startup_event; 
*init_stack_addr; 
*curr _stack _ addr; 





/* / / / / / / / / / / I //1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I / / I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1// I I I I II/I I I I I I I /II 
. Function Prototypes 
/1 I I I I 1// I I /1 IIIII / III / /11 I IIIII IIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIII I 11/111 / IIIIII III I *1 
/* -- general prototypes -------------------------------------------- *1 
void initStateSystem(void); 
void restore_IntTraps(void); 
void * tmalloc(void ); 
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void tstrncpy(char * str1, char * str2, int n); 
void * tfree(void * ptr); 
extern void far * save Jnitregs 
(void * stack, 
void * start_addr, 
void * argument, 
int state_num); 
extern void tprint( char * string); 
extern void init_IntTraps(void); 
extern void setClockInterrupt( unsigned long min_clock_value ); 
extern void setClockIntValue(void); 
extern void scheduler(void); 
extern void enableInts(void); 
extern void condenableInts(int); 
extern int disableInts(void); 
extern void enableSched(void); 
extern void disableSched(void); 
extern event SystemEvent[]; 
extern unsigned long * SystemClock; 
/* -- event related prototypes -------------------------------------- * / 
void clearSystemEvent( event eventJd); 
int defineEventFct( event eventJd, 
int ( *start_addr) (event eventJd, void * arg ), 
void * argument ); 
void Transit( void ); 
void SAKTest(void ); 
void Reattach(void); 
void Login(void ); 
void Logout(void ); 
void Switch_Session(void ); 
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/* -- State related prototypes --------------------------------------- * / 
State * defineState(int ( *start_addr) (void * arg), 
void * argument, 
unsigned stack_size, 
int state _ num, 
char * state_name ); 
State * redefineState(State * state); 
void transit(int current_state, int new_state); 
void * returnState_Stackframe(void); . 
int tenninateState(State * state ); 
int tenninateState _ num(int state _num ); 
typedef struct { 
unsigned int ax; 
unsigned int bx; 
. unsigned int cx; 
. unsigned int dx; 
unsigned int si; 
unsigned int di; 
unsigned int es; 





/* / / / / / / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / fill / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / II/II / // // // /II fill 
Name: TCBEX.c (Trusted Computing Base Extension Executive) 
Author: Jason Hackerson (from code originally written 
by ~chaeIPodanoffsky) 
Date: 10 September 1998 
Function: Provides the operating executive that operates the Trusted Computing 
Base Extension.Note: Some functions remain from original RTX code. These 
functions are deemed potentially useful for future implementations of the TCBEX. 
III/III/III // II/II //////////////// fill III/II II/II/II II/III/lilt / fill / * / 
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1*1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I II I II II II I I I I I I I I II II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Include these libraries when working with DOS and need their 
functionality. Not needed otherwise 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <malloc.h> 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I 
#include "tcbex.h" 
/* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II IIIII II IIII 111111// III IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII III II 
tcbex internal data structures 
II II III IIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II IIIIII II 11// IIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIII I *1 
int Current_State_Array[ NUM_STATES]; 
int Event_Array[ NUM_EVENTS ]; 
State * State_Matrix[ NUM_EVENTS ][NUM_STATES]; 
stateTypes TCBE_state; 
systemEvents TCBE _event; 
flagTyp·es TCBE _flag; 
int System _ flags[3]; 
State * currentState; 
State States[NUM_STATES]; 
1*11 I I I I I I I I 1// I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1// I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Left over from R TX. May be useful to define events that are more 
robust than current events 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I 
typedef struct { 
int (* fct)(event eventJd, void *arg); 
void *argument ; 
} eventFct; 
1* I I I I I II II IIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIII II III IIIIII IIIIII IIIIIII IIIIIIII 
Allocate States and Counters 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I II IIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII *1 
int actual_states = 0; 
State *currentState = NULL; 
unsigned long *SystemClock = far_address(Ox0040, Ox006C); 
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1* I I I I I /II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1/11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Data structures for memory management 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II II I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I II I I 1*1 
struct Block _ Type{ 
int block _ num; 
void * block_address; 
int free; 
}; 
struct Block_Type Block_Array[20]; 
#define NOT(a) ~(a) 
#define PROTECTION_PATTERN OxCOC4 
1* III II IIIIII IIIIIIIIII II II IIIIIIIIIII IIIIII III IIIIIIIIIII III IIIII I I I I I 
defines an event function. 
1* stack protection signature *1 
Us a null fct argument to clear an event function. 
Not used by TCBEX; may be useful for future implementations 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I /II I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
int defineEventFct( event eventJd, 
{ 
int ( *fct) (event eventJd, void * arg), 
void * argument) 
if( eventJd > NUM_EVENTS ) 
return ERR _INVALID yVENTID; 
EventFunctions[ eventJd ].fct = fct; 
EventFunctions[ eventJd ].argument = argument; 
return SUCCESS; } . 
*1 
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1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Sets any system event 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I II 111/111111 III IIIII IIIII IIIIIII *1 




Event_Array[eventjd] = 1; 
enablelntsO; 
1* I II I I I II I I I I I I I I I II I I I II II I I II II I I I I IIIII IIIII III IIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII 
waits for keyboard event 
11111111/111 IIII II IIIII I II I III II II III III 1/ IIIIIII 111/ IIIIII 111/11/11/ *1 
extern void waitKbdEvent(void ) 
{ 
setSystemEvent( KEYBOARD_WAIT ); 
} 
1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I / 11/ I I I I I III /III/I I I I I I I 1/ / I I I I I I I I I I 
Sets keyboard event in SystemEvent 
I II I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I III I II IIII II II /1 IIIIII IIII I III/III IIII I I IIII I *1 
extern void setKbdEvent(void) 
{ 
setSystemEvent( KEYBOARD_WAIT ); 
} 
1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I IIIII I II I I III/I I III I I I I III IIIIII IIII IIIII II II III IIIIIIII 
Sets SAK event in SystemEvent 
IIIIIII I III IIIII IIII I I I II III/II III 111/11/111111 I III IIIIIII IIII IIIIIII *1 
extern void setSAKEvent(void ) 
{ 








1* III IIIIII IIII II III/II II III II IIIIIII II IIIII III IIIIIIIIIIII IIIII I IIIII I 
Sets Transit event in SystemEvent 
IIII III III I I I I I I 11/ II 11/ I I I III III I I I I I I I I I I I 11/ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I *1 
extern void setTransitEvent(void ) 
{ 






1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 11/ I I I I I I II I I II I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Sets Login event in SystemEvent 
11/ ill I I I I I I I I I I I I I III/ lilli/II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I II I III I I I II I I I I I I I *1 
extern void setLoginEvent(void ) 
{ 
setSystemEvent( LOGIN_EVENT ); 
} 




1* III III IIIIII II I II III II IIII IIIII II I IIII I I II III III II I I I I I I II I I I II II IIII 
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Sets Logout event in SystemEvent 
IIIIIIIIIIIII IIII II IIIII I I I II III IIIII II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I *1 
extern void setLogoutEvent(void ) 
{ 






1* IIIIIIII II III IIIIIIIII III II III IIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIII I I I I I I I I I I 
Sets Switch Session event in SystemEvent 
IIIIIIIIIIII IIIII IIIIIIIII IIII III IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II I II II I I *1 
extern void setSwitchSessionEvent(void ) 
{ 






1* IIIIIIIII II III IIIIIIII IIII IIII IIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Sets Reattach event in SystemEvent 
IIIIIIIIIIIII II III III IIII I II I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II *1 
extern void setReattachEvent(void ) 
{ 







/* / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / 
Support routine: returns hello as a place marker when debugging 
assembly code 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 11/ 11/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / * / 
void hello(void ){ 
tprint(" Hello "); 
} 
/* / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Function returns the stack pointer for the ~urrent stack when 
switching stacks. 
printf statement requires stdio.h 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 11/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /* / 
extern void * returnState_StackFrame(void) 
{ 
} 
/*printft" \nRSSF %#08.4lx \nil, (int *)currentState->curr_stack_addr);*/ 
return ( currentState? curr~ntState->curr_stack_addr : NULL); 
/* / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / ///1// / // / / / / / / / / // / / / / / 
Support routine: sets stack address of a suspended stack. 
printf statement requires stdio.h 
// /////// ///// /// //11/// ///// ////// /// / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / * / 
void saveCurrentState_Stack(void * stack) 
{ 
if ( currentState && stack) 
currentState->curr_stack_addr = stack; 
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l*printft"SCCS stack addr %#08.4lx \n",(int *)currentState->curr_stack_addr);*1 
} 
1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I /II I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Debugging function that provides an address. Needs stdio.h to display 
the address. 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I /II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I 
void printa( void * address) 
{ 
tprint(" Printing Address "); 
I*printft"address = %#08.4lx \nil, (int *)address);*1 
} 
1* IIIIIIII III 11/111111 I III II 11/1111111 IIIIIII IIIIIIIII IIIIIII III II I I II I 
Clear a system event. From RTX, may be useful for future 
implementation. 
I I I /1 I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II II I I I II I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I /II II I I I *1 
void clearSystemEvent( unsigned eventJd) { . 
} 
disablelntsO; 
Event_Array[eventJd] = 0; 
enablelntsO; 
1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
ClearEventArrayO 
IIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIII III IIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII III II IIII III *1 
void ClearEventArray(int·index) 
{ 
Event_Array[index] = 0; 
} 
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/* / / / / / / / // / / / / / /II / / / / / // / / // / / / / / / / // / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / // / // / // // //11// 
tmemset : overwrites memory with given' symbol 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /II / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / // / // / / / / / / / / * / 
void * tmemset(void * pointer, int value, int len){ 
} 
int i; 
int * t = pointer; 
for (i = 0; i < len; i++){ 
*(t + i) = value; , 
} 
return(pointer ); 
/* ///// // /// /// // ///// / / / / / / / / /// // / /// / ////// //// ///////////// /// ///11 
Function: mem init 
. Input: none 
Output: none 
Purpose: initializes the memory queue 
//11 / / / / // / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /1/ / / / / / / // / / / /////11/ / * / 
void memjnit(void){ 
, int i; 
for(i = 0; i < 20; i++){ 
} 
} 
Block_ Array[i], block _ num = i; 
Block_ Array[i]. block_address '= 0; 
Block_Array[i] ,free = 1; 
/* / / / /// / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /// // / / ///////////// //// / ////////////// / /// 
Function: block malIoc 
Input: int i 
Output: void pointer to a block of memory 
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Purpose: allocate assign a block of memory 
I I I I I I III IIIIIIIII I II III III II III IIIIIII lilli/II III IIIIII IIII I I IIIII II II *1 
void * block_malloc(int i){ 
const int mem start = OxlOOO; 
const int start = OxOOOO; 
const int buffer_size = Ox0400; 
int buffer; 
const int block_size = OxIOOO; 
int block; 
void * address = far_address(OxOOOO,OxOOOO); 
} 
buffer = buffer_size * 0 + 1); 
block = block_size *(i + 1) + (buffer); 
address = far_address(start, block); 
address = far_address(mem_start, buffer); 
retum( address); 




Output: void pointer to a block of memory 
Purpose: allocate memory to each state 
I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I II I I I I I I I III I II IIII I I I I I IIIII III 11/ I II I IIIII *1 
void * tmalloc(void ){ 
} 
int i; 
forO = 0; i < 20; i++){ 
if (Block _ Array[i].free) { 
Block _ Array[i].free = 0; 
break; 
} 
retum(block _ malloc(i)); 
} 
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1* I I I I I I I I I I I I I 11/ I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 111/11/1 I I 11/ I I I I I I I I I I I II II 
Function: tfree 
Input: void * address 
Output: void pointer to a block of memory . 
Purpose: frees the aIIocated memory block 
I I I II I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1111/1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 11/111111 III 1111/ III II *1 
void * tfree( void * address){ 
} 
int i; 
Block_Array[i].free = 1; 
retum( address); 
1* II IIIIII II IIIII I I I I II I I II I I II I I II II III I I II I I III 11111111111/11111 /1111 
State Machine Engine: Runs through State matrix to get the next state. 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 11/ I I I I IIIIIII II IIIII I *1 
void * .StateSelect(void) 
{ 
int e,s, eflag; 
stateTypes Data_Path = DP _INIT; 
systemEvents Reattach_Event = REATTACH_EVENT; 
State * new_state = NULL; 
int old_state _ num = currentState->state _ num; 
eflag = 0; . 
while ( new_state = NULL ){ 
while( eflag < NUM _ EVENTS){ 
1* --- first find event ---*1 
if (Event _ Array[ eflag]) { 
e = eflag; 
eflag = NUM _EVENTS; 
for (s = 0; s < NUM_STATES; s++){ 
1* --- Then check the state ---*1 
if(Curren(State_Array[sD { 
1*--- Ifnot in Data Path or not reattaching, 
. then need to restart current state --~ * I 
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} 
if(s> 3 && s < Data_Path && e != Reattachpvent){ 
new_state = redefineState(State _ Matrix [ e][ s]); 
break; 
} 1* if(s> 3 && s < Data_Path && e != Reattach_Event *1 
else{ 
new_state = State_Matrix[e][s]; 
break; 
}/* else *1 
} 1* if (Current_State _ Array[ s]) *1 
}/* for s *1 
}/* if(Event_Array[eflag]) *1 
else eflag++; 
}/* while eflag *1 
}/* while *1 
. ClearEventArray( e); 
if (new_state = NULL){ 
new_state = currentState; 
} 
currentState = new_state; 
Current_State_Array[old_state_num] = 0; 
.Current_ State ~ Array[ currentState-:>state _num] = 1; 
return currentState->curr _stack _ addr; 
1* IIIIIIII IIII IIII IIIIIII IIIIIIIII III IIIII I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
. This function initializes the TCB'EX's data structures 





tmemset(States, 0, sizeof(States»; 
tmemset(Event_Array, 0, sizeof(Event_Array»; 
tmemset( Current_State _Array, 0, sizeof(Current _State_Array»; 
tmemset(State -,-Matrix, 0, sizeof(State _Matrix»; 
memjnitO; 
currentState = NULL; 
Current_State_Array[l] = 1; 
init_IntTrapsO; 
tprint(" State System Initialized "); 
/* /// / / / / / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / / /// / / / / ////// /// // /// /// / //1////// // // / / /// 
This function defines each state with a stack 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / / / / /1 // / / / / / / / / / /1/// // / / // / / / // / / / // / / / // / // / / / / / / / / /* / 
State '* defineState(int ( *start_addr) (void *. arg), 
void * argument, 
{ 
unsigned stack_size, 
int state _ num, 
char * state_name) 
void * stack _ addr; 
int * stack_bottom; 
State * state; 
state = &States[ state_num]; 
tmemset(state, NULL, sizeof(State»; 
if({stack_addr = tmallocO) = NULL) 
return NULL; 
stack_bottom = (int *)stac~addr; 
stack_bottom[ 0] = PROTECTION_PATTERN; 
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} 
stack_addr = (void * )«char *)stack_addr + stack_size - sizeof(int)); 
state->stack_size = stack_size; 
state->state _num = state _num; 
state->start_addr = start_addr; 
state->argument = argument; 
state->init _stack _ addr = stack _ addr; 
state->curr _stack _ addr = save Jnitregs 
( stack_ad dr, start_ad dr, argument, state_num); 
return (&States[ state _ num]); 
1*111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111///111111*1 
This function gives a state a new stack and address 
Space. 
1* IIIIIIIIIII IIIIIII II II IIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIII III IIIIIIIIIIII II 1/// II I II I II 1111* I 
State *. redefineState(State *state ) 
{ 
void * stack _addr; 
void * start_addr; 
void * argument; 
int * stack_bottom; 
int state _ num; 
, unsigned stack_size; 
1* h . I· _I:': • *1 --- get testate s llUormatIon ---
state->free = TRUE; 
start addr = state->start addr; 
- -
state _num = state->state _num; 
argument = state->argument; 
1*--- free the space that it was using before --*1 
tfree(state->init_stack_addr); 
1*--- now give'it new space and information ---*1 
if( (stack_addr = tmallocO) = NULL) 
return NULL; 1* iftmalloc failed *1 
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.} 
stack_bottom = (int *)stack _ addr; 
stack_bottom[ 0] = PROTECTIONYATTERN; 
stack_addr = (void * )((char *)stack_addr + stack_size - sizeof(int»; 
state->stack_size = stack_size; 
state->init_stack_addr = stack_addr; 
state->curr _stack _addr ,= save jnitregs 
( stack_addr, start_ad dr, argument, state_num); 
return state; 
/* / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Called from terminateState_num. Frees the memory of the state pointed at. 
Modified to overwrite that portion of memory. 
/ / / / / /II / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /II / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /* / 
int terminateState(State * state) { , 
if ( state ~ currentS tate ) 
currentS tate = NULL; 
state->free = TRUE; 
tfree(state->init_ stack _addr); 
tmemset(state, NULL, sizeof(State»; 
return(O); , 
} , 
/* /// ////// / // //// / // / // / / / / / / / / /// / / / / / / / / / / / // // //// / // /////// // / II / / / / / / / / 
Frees the memory of the corresponding state. Only called from Task_Exit 
in regs.asm. This function may be useful for redundancy when finishing 
or switching states 
/ / / / / / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / /7 / I / / / / / / / / / / / / / // / / / / // / / // / // / / // / / / // / // / / // / /* / 
int terminateS tate _ num(int state _num ) 
{ 




1* IIIIII IIIII II II II IIIIIIIIII IIIIII III II IIIIIIIIIIII IIIII III I III I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Left over from R TX. may be useful for future implementations 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1* I 
extern int x_keyboardEventFct(event eventjd, void * arg) 
{ 
int * kbd_buffPtr = far_address(Ox0040, Ox001A); 






II Name: TCBE Module.h 
I I Author: Jason Hackerson 
. II Date: 06 July 1998 
II Function: Provide the header file With global information for the 
I I entire TCBE System 
11----------------------------------------------------------------------------*1 
1* Structures used to pass data between modules and components on the TCBE and 
~he host computer* I 
struct Data ~lock _Record { 
char * Command; 
void * Data; 
}; 
112 
struct TCBE -.Data _Block_Record { 
char * Command; 
}; 
struct Data_Block_Record Data_Block; 
int Data_Block_Size; 
int TCBE_Initialize(void * argument); 
int TCBE_Display(void * argument); 
int DP _Path_Init(void * argument); 
int DP _Path(void * argument); 
e~ TCBE_Module.c 
1*------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II Name: TCBE_Module.c 
II Author: Jason Hackerson 
II Date: 08 September 1998 
II Purpose: Provides the TCBE Core modules for the TCBE. Also includes some 
II stub functions for the Data Path Module 
I I ----------------------------------------,-,.--------------------:--------------* I 
#include "tcbex.h" 
1* One session number assigned for each session in use*1 
int Session_Number; 
1* particular state of the CPU and OS when halted by the TCBE; to be' used when 
TCBE has ability to hold client OS State* I 
typedef struct { 
int Client OS Size; 
} Client _OS _Info_Record; 
1* Tables to hold the Client OS state and the appropriate session number*1 
struct Session_Info_Record{ 
int Session _ Num; 
Client OS Info Record Client OS Info; 
f - - - - --:. }; 
struct Session_Table_Record { 
int Current_Session_Number; 
struct Session_Info~ecord* Session_Info; 
}; 
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int DP ystablished = 0; 
} 
tprint("*** TCBE Loading Client OS ***"); 
1* Code to load Client OS *1 
DP Established = 1; 
return(1); 
int TCBE_Initialize(void * argument){ 




int TCBE_Display(void * argument){ 




int DP yath_Init(void * argument){ 
tprint(" Initializing Data Path "); 
1* Code to start data path *1 




tprint("*** Need to Load Client Operating System ***"); 






int DP _Path(void * argument){ 






II Name: TP Module.h 
II Author: Jason Hackerson 
II Date: 09 July 1998 
I I Function: Provide the header file for the Trusted Module of the TCBE 
11----------------------------------------------------------------------------*1 
1* Only the functions that form states need to be public *1 
int TP _Start_Trusted_Path(void * argument); 
int TP _Idle_Trusted_Path(void * argument); 
int TP _Confirm_Trustedyath(void * argument); 
int TP _Login(void * argument); 
int TP _Logout(void * argument); 
int TP _Switch_Session.,....Level(void * argument); 
g. TP Module.c 
1*------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II Name: TP _Module.c 
II Author: Jason Hackerson 
II Date: 10 September 1998 
I I Purpose: Provides the driver program for the TCBE. :These functions are 
. II stub functions. The Trusted Path developer should put the Trusted Path code 
II h r .· 
li-----------------------------------------------------------~----------------*I 
#include "tcbex.h" 
enum Trusted_Path_Status_Type {Esatblished, Not_Established}; 
enum Trusted_Path_State_Type {Idle, Confirming, Initializing, Logging_Out, 
Logging_In, Switching_ Session_Level, 
Clearing_Buffer} ; 
typedef int Encryption_Key; 
typedef int Data; 
1* structures to keep track of where the TCBE is in security levels*1 
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struct Trusted_Path _Session_Info _Record { 
int Session Number;' 
Encryption_Key Session_Encryption J(ey; 
}; 
1* This structure expands if able to hold multiple session states; 
II for initial implementation it will only have one entry*1 
struct Trusted_Path_Session_Table_Record{ 
int Current _ Session_Number; 
struct Trusted_Path _Session_Info _ Record* Trusted yath _Session Jnfo; 
.}; . 
1* Buffer holds requests*l 
struct Trusted_Path _ Buffer ~ecord { 
int Desired_Session J-evel; 
}; 
1* Self-explanatory*1 
struct Current_User Jnformation _Record { 
char * U sername; 
char * Password; 
Data Biometric Data; 
}; 
1* Global Values while operating in the Trusted Path*1 
struct Trusted_Path _Session_Info _Record Trusted_Path _Session_Info; 
struct Trusted_Path _Session_Table _Record Trusted_Path _Session_Table; 
struct Trusted_Path _Buffer_Record Trusted_Path _Buffer_Record; . 
struct Current _User_Information _Record Current_User _Information; 
int TP _Start_Session(int Session_Level){ return (2);} 
int TP _ Get_Session_Key(void){ return (2);} 
int result = 0; 
result = 1; 
tprint(" Starting Trusted Path "); 





int TP _Idle.;...Trusted_Path(void * argument){ 
commandTypes Command; 
static int count = 1; 
1* Code to display Trusted Path Menu or start screen *1 
1* Code to allow the user to input choice or command *1 
tprint(" Trusted Path Display "); 
if (count - O){Coinmand = CONFIRM;} 
if(count = l){Command = LOGIN;} 
if(count = 2){Command = LOGOUT;} 
if(count -.:. 3){Command = REATTACH;} 
if (c<?unt = 4) {Command = SWITCH_SESSION;} 
if(Command = CONFIRM){ 
. SAKTestO; 
} . I 
else if(Command = LOGIN) { 
LoginO; 
} 
else if(Command = LOGOUT) { 
LogoutO; 
} 
else if (Command = REATTACH) { 
ReattachO; . } . 




tprint (" Confirming Trusted Path "); 
1* Code to confirm the Trusted Path with the 





int TP _Login(void * argument){ 
tprint(" Logging in to High Assurance Server "); 




int TP _Logout(void * argument){ 
tprint(" Logging out of High Assurance Server "); 








."""""'""1"'""""''''"""''''''1""""1". , . 
; Standard Definitions.; 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
; (C) Copyright, 1991. Mike Podanoffsky 
All Rights Reserved. 




minusOne equ -1 
no equ 0 
yes equ 1 
false equ 0 
true equ 1 
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--pointer equ 0 
_segment equ 2 
,. - - ""!' - "'" - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ,- - - - -
; Dos Function Codes; Not used by TCBEX 



































; Entry Macro. 
'" ................................. "' 
entry macro label 








; alias Macro. 
, ....................................... "' 
alias macro label 




; Return Macro. 
, .................................. , 










; Define Double Argument. 
, .............................................. , 
darg macro label 
label = _ARGP 





; Define Argument. 
, .................................... , 
, 
arg macro label 
label = ,-ARGP 







; Temporary Storage. 
, ...................................... , 
targ macro label,reg 
ARGT = ARGT-2 
- -
label = ARGT 
pushedreg = no 
ifb <reg> 
push ax: 
pushedreg = yes 
end if 
ifnb <reg> 
irp treg, <ax:, bx, ex, dx, si, di, es, dS,f> 
ifidn <reg>, <treg> 
tpush reg 













;if not pushed 
;really a value. 
; Temporary Double Arg Storage. ; 
, ..................................................... , 
tdarg' macro label,reg,seg 
_ARGT = _ARGT-4 
label = _ ARGT 
pushedreg = no 






pushed reg = yes 
pushedseg = yes 
endif 
ifnb <reg> 
irp treg, <ax, bx, ex, dx, si, di, es, ds,t> 
ifidn <reg>, <treg> 
tpush reg 







mov word ptr label [bp],reg 
mov word ptr label [bp+2],zero 
pushedreg = yes 




ifidn <seg>, <tseg> . 
tpush seg 










; Check for B~d Label 
'" .................................... , 
chklabel macro label 
;if not pushed 
;really a value. 
;32 bits. 
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ifidn <label>, <offset> 
error "bad label" 
endif 
ifidn <label>,<org> 
error "bad label tl 
endif 
ifidn <label>,<ptr> 
error "bad label" 
endif 
ifidn <label>,<end> 
error "bad label" 
endif 
ifidn <label>,<endp> 
error "bad label" 
endif 
ifidn <label>,<even> 
error "b(l.d label" 
endif 
ifidn <label>, <segment> 




; Define Double Argument. ; 
," •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••• "' 
getdarg macro seg,reg,label 
loadedflag = no 
ifidn <seg>, <es> 
.. les reg,dword ptr label [bp] 
loadedflag = yes 
endif 
ifidn <seg>,<dS> 
Ids reg,dword ptr label [bp] 




mov reg, word ptr label [bp] 




; Define Argument. 
'" ................................. "' 
getarg macro reg, label 




; Store Double Argument. 
, .......................................... "' 
stordarg macro label,reg,seg 
mov word ptr label [bp ],reg 
. I 




; Store Argument. 
'" ................................ .. , 
storarg macro label, reg 



















; Restore Registers. 













; Save Segments. 
, ........................................ ,., 
save Segments macro reg 1 ,reg2,reg3 ,reg4 ,reg5,reg6,reg7 ,reg8,reg9 ,regO 




































; Restore Segments. 
'" .............. : ....... ;: ..... "." ... , 




































; This Segment 
,_ ...................................................... , 













































; Call Dos. 
'" ...................................................... , 










; Set Interrupt Vector. 
) ...................................................... " 
setIntTrap macro intvector, newvector, savevector 
callDos GetIntVector, intvector 
mov word ptr [savevector + 2 ], es 
mov word ptr [savevector ], bx 
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mov dX,seg newvector 
mov ds,dx 
mov dx, offset newvector 
cal1Dos SetIntVector, intvector 
endm 
i. Regs.asm 
title "tcbex register support II 
page ,132 
.1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111. 
; Interrupti Register Support for TCBEX 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
(C) Copyright, 1991. Mike Podanoffsky 
AUI FUghts Reserved 
Technical questions: 508/454-1620. 
Modified by Jason Hackerson, September 1998 . 




reg_supp segment para public ICODEI 





public _ condenableInts 
public _ enableInts 
public _ disablelnts, 
public _savejnitregs 
public jnit_IntTraps 
public Jestore _ IntTraps 
; provides simple print function 
; iret scheduler call 
; far call 'scheduler call 
; keyboard event function 
; allow ints on cond 
; enable interrupts 
; disable interrupts 
; used to init a taskls stack 
; initial state interrupt traps 
; restore interrupt traps 
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public _ SaveRegisters 
public _ RestoreRegisters 
extm _ terminateState _ num:proc 
extm _StateSelectproc 
extm _saveCurrentState _ Stack:proc 
extm JetumState _ StackFrame:proc 





; Flags/ Storage Definitions 
'" ........................................... , 
schedulerPending: dw 0 
tcbex pataSegment: dw 0 
_ originalDosTrap: dd 0 
_ originalTickInt: dd 0 
_ originalKbdSvcTrap: dd 0 
_ originalKbdHdwTrap: qd 0 
_ originalScmTrap: dd 0 
. OldInt9 dw ? 
OldInt8 dw ? 
OldIntlO dw ? 
OldInt16 dw ? 
OldInt21 dw ? 





KbdFlags equ <byte ptr ds: [17h]> 
total ints: dwO 
.tIIttlltllllllll"'''"IIfIIIIflUl'''''''''''IIIfllIIl. 
; Macro Definitions. 
'" .................................. , 
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Int macro loc 
pushf 
call dword ptr cs:[loc] ; keep rentrancy problems down. 
endm 
.IItIl""IIIII",llI'n'I'tlttl""I"""1nlll",tllt. 
; save jnitregs 
. . 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Initializes stack for the state 
void * save jnitregs 
( void far * stack, 
void far * start _ addr, 
void far * argument, 
int task jd ); 
'" ..................................................... 0' 
entry _savejnitregs 
darg_stack 
darg _start_ addr 
darg _argument 
arg _taskjd 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - -"- - - - - - - - - - - _. - - - - - - -
; order of items stored to task's stack 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
task id equ 40 
- -
_argument equ 36 "void far * , 
taskExit equ 32 ; task exit address 
start addr equ ~8 ; start address 
- -
yusht' equ 26 ; push flag emulation 
yush_ax equ 24 ;ax 
yush_bx equ 22 ; bx 
yush_cx equ 20 ; ex 
yush_dx equ 18 ; dx 
yush_si equ 16 ; si 
yush_di equ 14 ; di 
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yush_bp equ 12 ; bp 
yush_ds equ 10 ; ds 
yush_es equ 08 ; es 
yush_dta equ 04 ; dta 
yush _ stackf equ 00 ; null stack frame pointer 
FLAGS VALUE equ 0246h ; ei zr nc 
,. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
; execution starts here. 
,. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
saveSegments 
push ds 





; disk transfer address 
; ds:bx 
sub bx,_taskjd+2 ; total arguments we'll store 
,. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
; task stack will contain task jd, return address, ... 
,. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
getarg ax, _task jd 
mov word ptr _taskjd[bx],ax 
getdarg dx, ax, _argument 
mov word ptr _argument+2[bx],dx 
mov word ptr _argument[bx ],ax 
mov word ptr taskExit+2[bx], seg taskExit 
- . 
mov word ptf _taskExit[bx], offset taskExit 
mov word ptr yushfIbx], FLAGS _VALUE ; flags. 
getdarg dx, ax, _start _ addr 
mov word ptr _start_addr+2[bx],dx 
mov word ptr _start_addr[bx],ax 
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,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
; now save on stack ALL registers 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
xor.ax,ax 
may word ptr yush_ax[bx],ax 
may word ptr yush _ bx[bx ],ax 
may word ptr yush_cx[bx],ax 
may word ptr yush_dx[bx],ax 
may word ptr yush_si[bx],ax 
may word ptr yush_di[bx],ax 
may word ptr yush_bp[bx],ax 
mov word ptr yush _ ds[bx ],ss 
may word ptr yush_es[bx],ss 
pop word ptr yush _ dta[bx] 
pop word ptr yush_dta + 2[bx] 
xor ax,ax 
; seg (dta) 
; address 
movword ptr yush_stackf[bx],ax ; seg " (stack frame) . 
may word pti yush_stackf+ 2[bx],ax ; address 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
; return adjusted stack address 








; dx:ax contain remaining stack. 
---------------------------~ 
N a parameters. 
, 
Will suspend' current task, schedule next task. 
See related function: ischeduleO for isr calls. 
, .......................................................................................... , 
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,-scheduler proc far 





call returnState StackFrame 
- -






call _ saveCurrentState _Stack 
sti 
. xor dx,dx 
~-----------~-------------------
~ stack switch 
~-------------------------------
scheduler 32: 










~ NULL value? 
~ if new state then switch 
~ else restore 
~ switch state stacks. 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
; if return, stack switch 
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,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
scheduler 38: 
call _saveCurrentState_Stack ; restore stack frame. 
sti ; ok ints now 
; restore the registers 
; first six pops get the stack pointer to the correct spot on the 

















xor ax, ax 





; this will restore ints 
; marker for scheduler switc~ng 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
No parameters. 
Will suspend current task, schedule next task. 
Perfonns an iret. Some ISRs may find this call 
preferable. 
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, ....................................................... , 






,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
This process is called whenever a task terminates. 
Calls scheduler to release task. 
, ...................................................... . 
taskExit proc far 
movbp,sp 
mov dx, word ptr [bp] 
; switch to temp stack, then ... 
. ( 
eli 
; didn't get here through a call 
; should be task jd 
mov ds, word ptr cs:[tcbex_DataSegment] 
mov ax,seg temp_stack 
mov sS,ax 
mov sp,offset temp...:..stack 
sti 
push dx 









; copy to stack 
; terminate task 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Enables interrupts for C programs. 
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_ enableInts endp 
.... II"IIIII"IIIII'IIIIIII"""""It"'ntll""n". 
; disableIntsO 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Disables interrupts for C programs. 
' ••••• 0 •••• 0 ••••• 0 •• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 0.0 ••••••• • , 
disableInts proc far 
pushf 
pop ax 
and ax,_ flags jf 
jz disableInts_ 08 
movax,I 
dlsableInts _ 08: 
eli 
ret 
, _ disableInts endp 
.11111111111'1111'1111111111'111""1111"1111'""",,,. 
; condenableIntsO 
; copy flags to ax. 
; ifints were disabled --> 
; if ints are .enabled. 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Conditional enables interrupts. Use disableInts to 
disable interrupts. This is a convenience function. 
," •• " •••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••• 0 •••• 0 •••••••••••• 
entry _ condenableInts 
or ax,ax 





_ condenableInts endp 
;Iint 08111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111; 
; TimerTick 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
This ISR is called every clock tick (int 08) 
If the current clock value at interrupt equals or 
passes the next required clock value, the scheduler 
is called to determine what action is required next. 







_ Int _ originaITickInt 
inc word ptr cs:[ totaljnts ] 
; emulate int call 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
; see if min timer value expired .. 




mov ax, word ptr [ bx ] 
mov dx, word ptr [ bx + 2 ] 
. push cs 
pop ds 
jg TimerTick _ 40 
sti 
xor ax,ax 
; set ds to current. 
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saveRegisters 
mov ds, word ptr cs:[tcbexJ)ataSegment] 










; restore _ IntTrapsO 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
, 
; Restores interrupt traps before exit. 
; Not used for the TCBEX. 
, ................... " ................................... . 
Jestore_IntTraps proc far 
Ids dX,dword ptr cs:LoriginalDosTrap] 
callDos SetIntVector, 21h ; restore vector to Int21. 
Ids dX,dword ptr cs:LoriginalKbdHdwTrap] 
callDos SetIntVector, 09h 
Ids dX,dword ptr cs:LoriginaIScmTrap] 
callDos SetIntVector, 10h 
Ids dX,dword ptr cs:LoriginalKbdSvcTrap] 
callDos SetIntVector, 16h 
Ids dX,dword ptr cs:LoriginalTickInt] 







,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Int 21 traps to .here. We can detect DMA address 
change, terminate process, and whether we are 
entering/exiting DOS. 
'0000.0 •• 0.0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••• 0 0 0 •• , 
Int21 proc far 
cmp ah,ExitProgram 
jz Int21_12 
cmp ah, T erminateProcess 
jnz Int21_ 20 
Int21 '12: 
push ax ; save return code. 
Ids dX,dword ptr cs:LoriginalDosTrap] 
callDos SetIntVector, 21h ; restore vector to Int21. 
call Jestore _IntTraps 
pop ax 
Int21 20: 
_Int _ originalDosTrap 
ret 2 
; emulate int call 




SetCmd - this procedure communicates with the 8042 
processor in the keyboard. Code borrowed from Randall 







xor cx, cx 
moval, 'F' 
call PutcBIOS 
xor ax, ax 
Wait4Empty: in al,64h 
test ai, lOb 
loopnz Wait4Empty 
;send command to the 8042 
pop ax 









,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
;Read Keyboard status register 
;Input Buffer full? 
;if so wait until empty 
Int 16 is used to read the keyboard. It needs to 
trap to a waitKbdEvent.o function which sets the 
KBD event flag in the current task and exits to the 
scheduler. 
'" ..................................................... . 
Int 16 proc far 
or ah,ah 




jnz Int 16_20 
; is it a keyboard wait call ? 
; nO,go ahead and execute --> 
; we'll call ourselves 
; ifkey available, no need waiting --> 
mov ds, word ptr cs:[tcbexJ)ataSegment] 





_ Int _ originalKbdSvcTrap 




,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Int 09 is the keyboard interrupt. If a key is 
detected and saved by the ROM BIOS it will force 
the setKbdEvent and call the scheduler to evaluate 
task priorities. This code has been modified by 
Jason Hackerson. Original RTX code has been commented 
out. 
, ....................................................... , 
Int09 proc far 









';mov bx, 1 Ah 
mov aI, 40h 
call SetCmd 
eli 
xor cx, cx 
Wait4Data: 
; do normal kbd duties. 
; look at bios kbd area 
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in al,64h 
test aI, lOb 
loopz Wait4Data 
in al,60h 
cmp aI, SAK _Scan_Code 
jne Origlnt9 
;is it the alt-S key? 








;mov ax, word ptr [bx] 






; to the 8259APlC 
mov ds, word ptr cs:[tcbex_DataSegment] 



























,- - - - --- - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - -- - -, 
Sample of an event fct. This returns true (non-zero) 
when keyboard data is available; false (zero) when no 
keyboard data is available. 
'" ...................................................... , 







mov ax, word ptr [ bx ] 
cmp ax, word ptr [ bx + 2 ] 
sti 
movax,O 
jz keyboardEventFct_ 08 
movax,l 
keyboardEventFct_ 08: 






; look at bios kbd area 
; 1Ah 
; 1Ch 
; false if no input available. 
; if zero, no keys pending -> 
; true if input available. 
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
This would handle any program to Int 10 ca1ls. There 
are no screen special considerations unless you need 
to support different windows per task. 







Set)ntTrap macro intno, newint, oldint 
eli 
mov ax, Oh 
mov es, ax 
mov ax, es:[intno*4] 
mov word ptr oldint, ax 
mov ax, es:[intno*4+2] 
mov word ptr oldint+2, ax 
mov es:[intno*4], offset newint 





,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
Init int traps for whole system. Called by 
initTaskSystemO· 
'" .......... "," ' ...... ~ •... 0: ....................... "," .... , 
:....init_IntTraps proc far 
saveSegments 
mov ax, ds 




10, IntlO, OldlntlO 
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Set_IntTrap 16,IntI6, _originalKbdSvcTrap 
Set_IntTrap 08, TimerTick, OidInt8 








push word ptr [bp+ 14 ] 
push word ptr [bp+ 12 ] 
push word ptr [bp+ 1 0 ] 
mov word ptr [bp+OO ], ax 
mov word ptr [bp+02 ], bx 
mov word ptr [bp+04 ], ex 
mov word ptr [bp+06 ], dx 
mov word ptr [bp+08 ], si 
mov word ptr [bp+ 10 ], di 
mov word ptr [bp+ 12 ], es 








mov ax, word ptr [bp+OO ] 
~ points to bottom of table 
~ return address 
; bp push.ed on call 
~ points to bottom of table 
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moy bx, word ptr [bp+02 ] 
mov cx, word ptr [bp+04 ] 
moy dx, word ptr [bp+06 ] 
mov si, word ptr [bp+08 ] 
mov di, word ptr [bp+ 1 0 ] 
moyes, word ptr [bp+ 12 ] 












mov bp, sp 
push ax 
push es 
. push bx 
Ies bx, [bp + 6] 




mov aI, es:[bx] 
cmp aI, 0 
jnz PrintLoop 
inc bx 

















; temporary stack 





segment para 'OAT At 





# Borland C++ IDE generated makefile 




# Borland C++ tools 
# 
IMPLIB = Implib 
BCCDOS = Bcc +BccDos.cfg 
TLINK = TLink 
TLIB = TLib 
TASM =Tasm 
# 
# IDE macros 
# 
# 
# External tools 
# 





IDE LinkFLAGSDOS = -LD:\BC5\LIB 
IDE BFLAGS= 
LinkerLocaIOptsAtDOS_tcbedexe = -c -Tde 
ResLocalOptsAtDOS_tcbedexe = 
BLocaIOptsAtDOS _tcbedexe = 
ComplnheritOptsAt_tcbedexe = -ID:\BC5\INCLUDE 
LinkerInheritOptsAt_tcbedexe =-x 
LinkerOptsAt _ tcbedexe = $(LinkerLocaIOptsAtDOS _ tcbedexe) 
ResOptsAt_tcbedexe = $(ResLocaIOptsAtDOS_tcbedexe) 
BOptsAt_tcbedexe = $(BLocaIOptsAtDOS_tcbedexe) 
# 
# Dependency List 
# 
Dep_tcbe = \ 
tcbe.exe 
tcbe : BccDos. cfg $(Dep _ tcbe) 
echo MakeNod.e 
Dep _tcbedexe = \ 
regs."obj\ 
tp _mod-I. obj\ 
tcbe.obj\ 
tcbex.obj\ 
tcbe Yl-l. obj 
tcbe.exe: $(Dep_tcbedexe) 
$ (TLINK) @&&J 
Iv $(IDE_LinkFLAGSDOS) $(LinkerOptsAt_tcbedexe) 
$(LinkerInheritOptsAt _ tcbedexe) + 
D:\BC5\LIB\cOI.obj+ 
regs.obj+ 







k. Batch File 
j.bat 
tasm Irnx regs.asm 
bee -e -rnI tebex.e 
bee -e -mI tp_mod~I.e 
bee -e -rnI tebe m~ I.e 
bee -e -rnI tebe.e 
make 
copy d:\be5\bin\heode\tebex\tebe.exe a: 
. I 
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